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Increasing public investment would stimulate employ-
ment and economic growth and provide a more effective 
means of moving out of recession than current austerity 
policies.
This report makes such a case for public investment that 
is in social as well as physical infrastructure. By social in-
frastructure we mean education, care and health services 
and more specifically for this report, social care activities, 
that is care for the elderly and disabled and for pre-school 
aged children. This notion of the social infrastructure in-
cludes the labour force that provides care services and its 
skills, as well as the buildings and facilities in which they 
work. By physical infrastructure we are referring to the 
construction sector and activities such as building hous-
ing, roads and railways, as this is the more usual outlet for 
the public investment called upon in times of recession in 
order to generate employment.
The case for public investment in times of high unem-
ployment and pervasive underemployment derives from 
Keynesian macroeconomic theory. The central argument 
is that unemployment and underemployment are due to a 
lack of effective demand in the economy and this lack of 
demand deters private investment, as there is no market 
for the products. The government should therefore fill this 
gap and invest directly in the economy to boost employ-
ment and aid economic recovery. Such investment would 
not only ensure resources, including labour, are fully em-
ployed; it should also lead to increased productivity and 
higher growth rates.
Public investment will create jobs directly in the activities 
where the investment takes place (for example, in build-
ing houses or providing childcare services). But there will 
also be knock-on or ‘multiplier’ effects on other sectors 
as jobs will be created in the industries that supply the 
necessary raw materials and services for the initial invest-
ment (known as the indirect employment effect). In addi-
tion the expansion of employment created by these jobs 
will lead to an expansion in household income, so new de-
mand is created for a whole range of goods and services 
that enter household consumption, such as food, cloth-
ing, housing, care services and entertainment (known as 
the induced employment effect). In short, the injection of 
demand into the economy by government investment will 
generate employment directly and indirectly and have an 
expansionary impact on overall demand. In this way such 
public investment will expand demand and help lift econ-
omies out of recession.
Executive summary
The advantage of this strategy is that in time the initial 
investment should generate benefits worth far more to 
society than it costs and therefore could justify increased 
public deficit and borrowing in the initial phase. There will 
be savings in public expenditure from the reduction in 
unemployment and social security payments that other-
wise would have to be made; the newly employed people 
will pay tax and in the longer term there will be returns 
from the investments themselves. In the example given 
of bridges and care services, these returns would arise 
from shorter journey times and a healthier more produc-
tive population.1
Conventionally, governments adopting a public invest-
ment strategy have invested in physical infrastructure, 
such as roads and bridges, as they increase the wealth 
of society as a whole and generate benefits that accrue 
over time. In this report we show that there are similar, al-
beit more gender equal, gains to be made by investing in 
social infrastructure, and specifically the caring industries. 
Investing in education and childcare similarly benefits so-
ciety as a whole and these benefits are generated over 
time as ‘better educated and cared for children grow into 
more productive happier adults. For these reasons we re-
fer to investment in the caring industries as investment in 
social infrastructure’ (Himmelweit, forthcoming).
In this report we present the theoretical arguments, evi-
dence from case studies and findings from our own em-
pirical research on the employment effects for men and 
women of investing in social infrastructure. We make the 
case for public investment at times of low growth, high 
unemployment and pervasive underemployment. We 
highlight the significance of investing in the caring infra-
structure, as well as in physical infrastructure; review the 
growing body of supporting research evidence and pro-
vide new empirical findings from our seven - country anal-
ysis (of Australia, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and 
US) which estimates the employment impact of increased 
public investment in the construction and care industries.
Our analysis shows that investing in either the construc-
tion or care industries would generate substantial in-
creases in employment. If 2% of GDP was invested in the 
care industry, and there was sufficient spare capacity for 
that increased investment to be met without transform-
ing the industry or the supply of labour to other indus-
tries,  increases in overall employment ranging from 2.4% 
to 6.1% would be generated depending on the country. 
This would mean that nearly 13 million new jobs would be 
1 This strategy, as Paul Krugman (2015) notes, is the textbook Keynesian response to recession and 
indeed has been followed by many governments in the past and was the initial response by the G20 
in response to the 2008 crisis, though less evident in the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact 
or in the UKs continued pursuit of austerity, both of which are influenced by neoliberal economic 
thinking.
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created in the US, 3.5 million in Japan, nearly 2 million in 
Germany, 1.5 million in the UK, 1 million in Italy, 600,000 
in Australia and nearly 120,000 in Denmark. As a conse-
quence the employment rate of women would increase 
by 3.3 to 8.2 percentage points (and by 1.4 to 4.0 percent-
age points for men) and the gender gap in employment 
would be reduced (by between half in the US and 10% 
in Japan and Italy), the precise amounts depending on 
specific country characteristics. A similar level of invest-
ment in the construction industries would also generate 
new jobs, but approximately only half as many and would 
increase rather than decrease the gender gap in employ-
ment (see Tables 13, 14 and 15).
Besides creating new jobs, investment in both childcare 
and social care would help tackle some of the central 
economic and social problems confronting contemporary 
societies: low productivity, the care deficit, demograph-
ic changes and continuing gender inequality in paid and 
unpaid work. 
Our findings show that governments seeking to expand 
employment would do well to increase public investment 
in the economy and that there are strong arguments for 
more of this investment being in the caring infrastructure 
than is currently the case. Investment in the care indus-
try, in addition to creating a higher number of jobs, would 
also address the care deficit and reduce gender inequal-
ity. Such a policy would contribute towards creating a 
more inclusive model of development as well as lifting 
economies out of recession.
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Increasing public investment would boost employment 
and economic growth and provide a more effective means 
of moving out of recession than current austerity policies.
In this report we make such a case for public investment 
that is in social as well as physical infrastructure. By invest-
ment in social infrastructure we mean investment in edu-
cation, health and social care services. Physical infrastruc-
ture refers to the construction sector and activities such 
as building housing, roads and railways and has been the 
more usual outlet for the public investment called upon in 
times of recession and high unemployment.
We begin by reviewing the theoretical arguments for in-
creased public investment, and specifically investment 
in social infrastructure, in the context of low economic 
growth, high unemployment and enduring gender in-
equality. We consider the broader case for investment in 
social infrastructure in terms of narrowing the gender em-
ployment gap and contributing to resolving the care defi-
cit identified in most OECD countries. We then review a 
number of studies which have identified positive impacts 
from investment in social infrastructure before presenting 
the findings from our own analysis.
Our empirical investigation is of seven high-income OECD 
countries: Australia, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK 
and US, chosen to reflect different regions of the world, 
different systems of economic and social regulation and 
because of data availability. We develop a quantitative 
tool using input-output tables and official statistics to es-
timate the direct and indirect employment effects of an 
increase of public investment in both the construction 
sector and the care industries (child and social care) as 
examples of physical and social infrastructure respective-
ly. Our findings show that both forms of investment would 
generate new jobs, while investment in the care indus-
tries would generate approximately twice as many jobs as 
investment in the construction sector.
More specifically, if 2% of GDP were invested in caring in-
dustries, we estimate that it would generate increases in 
overall employment ranging from 2.4% to 6.1% depending 
on the country. Nearly 13 million jobs would be created in 
the US, 3.5 million in Japan; between nearly 1 million in 
Italy to just over 2 million in Germany, and 1.5 million in the 
UK; 600,000 in Australia and nearly 120,000 in Denmark. 
We estimate that the majority of jobs created would be 
taken up by women (between 59% and 70% across the 
countries studied), reflecting in part the current concen-
tration of women in the care industries. However, because 
of the impact of the multiplier effect, many of the jobs cre-
ated would be outside the care sector, and so investment 
in the care industries would lead to increases in jobs for 
men as well as for women. We find that the employment 
rate of women would increase by between 3.3 and 8.2 
percentage points and that of men by between 1.4 and 
4.0 percentage points, so that the overall gender gap in 
employment would be reduced by between 1.6 and 4.2 
percentage points, depending on the labour market char-
acteristics of specific countries.
We conclude that countries seeking to boost employment 
could invest in social infrastructure, exemplified by social 
care services (which tend in political discourse to be ne-
glected as a form of social investment compared to health 
or education), as well as in traditional forms of physical 
infrastructure. Such investment would also contribute to-
wards greater gender equality by reducing employment 
gaps, improving working conditions in the care sector and 
increasing the options for informal carers to juggle paid 
work and caring.
Introduction
The boom, not the slump is the 
right time for austerity at the 
Treasury 
John Maynard Keynes (1937: 390) 
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Background
Contemporary economies are emerging slowly 
and unevenly from the financial crisis of 2008 
and the deepest recession ever recorded. To 
prevent overall economic collapse the G20 
countries initially coordinated an expansionary 
response which first made money available to 
rescue the banks and later tried to sustain their 
lending activities via quantitative easing in the 
hope that this would stimulate the private sec-
tor. In addition there was some public invest-
ment in physical infrastructure, that is, in the 
construction industries for building new roads 
and bridges, to promote increases in employ-
ment and, especially in male employment, which 
initially suffered more from the recession. No at-
tention was paid to the social or gender impact 
of this strategy, for example, to how particular 
social groups were likely to be affected by the 
support for banks. In the European Union’s Eco-
nomic Recovery Plan, for example, no mention 
was made of its potential gender impact, even 
though gender mainstreaming remains official 
EU policy (Bettio et al., 2012). 
By 2010 there were a few small signs of recovery. How-
ever, governments became concerned about the high level 
of government spending and size of the sovereign debt. 
From 2010 onwards many governments across the globe 
simultaneously, though without coordination, embarked on 
austerity policies in an attempt to reduce the size of their 
public sector deficit and debt. This reduction was seen as 
a matter of economic survival and little attention was given 
to the negative impacts on economic growth and employ-
ment, to how different social groups were affected or to 
impacts on gender, or any other type of, equality.
Subsequently, the severity of austerity policies has varied 
between countries. In the US the government has contin-
ued to invest in physical infrastructure during this period 
and the reduction in economic growth has been less pro-
nounced than in the UK, for example, but cuts were made 
elsewhere, especially in social spending (Seguino, 2015). 
The UK government has continued to stress austerity and 
the need to eliminate the public sector deficit and debt, 
The Economic Rationale 
for Public Investment in 
Contemporary Times
though between 2012 and 2014 pursued a balanced rath-
er than contractionary budget policy. It hoped to stimu-
late the economy by reducing the personal income and 
business taxes and boosting the housing market, but fi-
nanced these through cuts in government services and 
social security payments. This strategy has yet to prove 
successful and has had highly regressive distributional 
consequences with especially negative impacts for wom-
en pensioners and lone parents (WBG, 2015; Krugman, 
2015; De Agostini et al., 2015). 
The public sector cutbacks have had particularly negative 
implications for women because in many countries, wom-
en are more likely than men to work in the public sector, 
more likely to be the users of government services and 
more likely to be the ones who have to fill the gap when 
the services are withdrawn, described by the UK Fawc-
ett Society as the triple jeopardy. In Europe foreign-born 
10|56 Investing in the Care Economy
women and in the US ‘women of color’ were the ones who 
were worst affected (Seguino, 2015). Analyses carried 
out by the House of Commons library and the Women’s 
Budget Group in the UK show that the impact of cuts in 
public expenditure and social security have fallen mainly 
on women; in the Conservative Party Summer 2015 budg-
et the proportion paid for by women was estimated to be 
as much as 78.9% (House of Commons Library Research 
Findings, 2015).  
This reversal of policy from public sector support for the 
economy and expansionary policies to austerity was jus-
tified in part by two academic papers. One (Reinart and 
Rogoff, 2010) predicted a dramatic decline in economic 
growth if public debt exceeded 90% of GDP, while a sec-
ond paper (Rosnik and Baker, 2012) maintained that if the 
public deficit and debt were reduced there would be a 
significant increase in business ‘confidence’ that would 
generate new investment and greater growth — an idea 
that became known as (the oxymoronic) ‘expansionary 
fiscal contraction’. However, these academic papers were 
subsequently shown to contain very basic flaws (Krug-
man, 2013; Herndon et al., 2014). In addition, the IMF rec-
ognised that they had underestimated the highly negative 
impact of reductions in public expenditure on the econo-
my (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). Some policymakers then 
began to rethink and pay more attention to alternative 
policies that advocate state investment expenditure at 
times of low growth.2
Contrasting economic theories: the case for 
public investment in place of quantitative 
aasing or tax cuts 
There are two contrasting approaches to try and stimu-
late economies in conditions of recession, low growth and 
high unemployment: on the one hand quantitative easing 
– a form of monetary policy and on the other hand direct 
public investment in the economy – a form of fiscal policy.
Quantitative Easing — Monetary Policy
The current policies pursued by many countries focus on 
deficit and debt reduction aimed at keeping interest rates 
low to restore the confidence of private investors. They are 
associated with neoliberalism; which stresses the efficacy 
of liberalisation, self-regulating markets and balanced 
budgets and insists that problems in economic function-
ing are to be sought in the state rather than in the market, 
in particular that the state is too large and inefficient. 
Hence fiscal policy is oriented towards the reduction of 
state expenditure (which otherwise would crowd out pri-
vate investment) and the reduction of the tax burden on in-
dividuals and firms in order to put more ‘money in people’s 
pockets’ and allow firms to keep more of their profits for 
2 European Union Countries are bound by the Stability and Growth Pact which limits the public 
sector deficit to no more than 3% and public debt no greater than 60% of GDP. By 2014, twelve 
member states were still above the deficit guidelines and 18 above those for debt. Eurostat (2015) 
Statistics Explained. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
File:Public_balance_and_general_government_debt,_2011%E2%80%9314_(%C2%B9)_(%25_
of_GDP)_YB15_II.png. Interestingly the countries that meet the debt requirements are all new 
member states.
investment. However, tax reductions have to be offset by 
cuts elsewhere in order to maintain the deficit under con-
trol. So the tax cuts are matched by cuts in public services 
and social security payments, thereby withdrawing money 
from people’s pockets and leading to the negative distri-
butional and gendered consequences outlined above.3        
In this context, the only way that monetary policy can be 
used to stimulate investment when interest rates are al-
ready low is through quantitative easing. Effectively the 
government prints money and releases funds to the banks 
(by buying their bonds) with the intention of stimulating 
bank lending and boosting private sector investment. 
To date neither quantitative easing nor tax cuts have 
proved to be very successful. Private sector investors 
need to know that their products will be sold and for this 
they need effective demand (that is demand for products 
that is matched by the ability to pay for them). People ben-
efiting from reduced taxes may face other constraints and 
uncertainties that inhibit their willingness to spend more 
(job insecurity, loss of public services that enable them 
to take jobs, etc.). So people and firms have in practice 
used their additional funds for saving or to pay off existing 
debts, and may have needed to replace public services 
being cut by providing additional unpaid work and hence 
reducing their earnings, none of which helps promote 
economic growth or employment. 
Direct Public Investment – Fiscal Policy 
This second approach underpins the perspective ana-
lysed in this report. The case for public investment at 
times of high unemployment and low growth derives from 
Keynesian macroeconomic theory. The central argument 
is that low growth and high unemployment are due to a 
lack of effective demand in the economy and this deters 
private investment. The government should therefore 
fill this gap and invest directly in the economy to boost 
employment and aid economic recovery, which could be 
achieved without stoking inflation provided there is spare 
capacity in the economy. 
Public investment will create jobs directly in the activity 
where the investment takes place (for example, in building 
a bridge or providing care services) but in addition there 
will be a knock on or ‘multiplier’ effect on other sectors. 
Jobs will also be created in the industries that supply the 
necessary raw materials and intermediate services for the 
investment. Such demand and employment effects will 
ripple down the supply chain, generating indirect employ-
ment in many industries (including within the industry/ies 
in which the original investment was made). These are 
known as the indirect employment effects, and they multi-
ply the direct employment effect of the original investment 
so that the overall degree of employment generation from 
any increase in investment will be larger than the immedi-
ate or direct effect of the initial investment project.
3 In the UK both the Coalition government 2010-15 and new Conservative governments have 
simultaneously cut personal income tax and reduced public sector services and social security 
payments – policies whose gender effects are documented by the Women’s Budget Group see 
e.g., WBG 2013 Budget Report at: http://wbg.org.uk/2013-a-budget-for-inequality-and-recession/ 
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In addition the expansion of employment created by 
these jobs will lead to an expansion in household income, 
so new demand is created for a whole range of goods and 
services such as food, clothing, caring services and leisure 
that enter household consumption which will generate 
further employment (known as the induced employment 
effect). Through direct, indirect and induced employment 
effects, the injection of demand into the economy by gov-
ernment investment will generate employment and have 
an expansionary impact on overall demand and so help 
lift the economy out of recession.
In time the initial investment should generate benefits 
worth far more to society than it costs as a consequence 
of the demand generated elsewhere in the economy. 
There will be savings in public expenditure from the re-
duction in unemployment or social security payments that 
otherwise would have to be made; the newly employed 
people will pay tax and in the longer term there will be 
returns from the investments themselves. In the examples 
given of bridges or care services, these returns would 
arise from shorter journey times or a healthier more pro-
ductive population. If there are concerns that these re-
turns will take too long to materialise and that the immedi-
ate impact of government investment will be to increase 
the deficit and debt by too great an amount, then a gov-
ernment - sponsored investment bank could be set up to 
directly encourage private investment.4
These arguments are not new but date back to the 1930s 
when John Maynard Keynes offered a solution to the 
1930s recession. Keynes is renowned for saying that the 
kind of public investment does not matter. He argued that 
even if people were employed to dig holes and then to 
fill them it would have a beneficial effect on the economy 
as a consequence of the multiplier effects as explained 
above. Specifically Keynes argued that:
“If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, 
bury them at suitable depths in disused coalmines 
which are then filled up to the surface with town rub-
bish, and leave it to private enterprise on well-tried 
principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again 
(the right to do so being obtained, of course, by ten-
dering for leases of the note-bearing territory), there 
need be no more unemployment and, with the help 
of the repercussions, the real income of the commu-
nity, and its capital wealth also, would probably be-
come a good deal greater than it actually is. It would, 
indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the 
like; but if there are political and practical difficulties 
in the way of this, the above would be better than 
nothing.” (Keynes, 2007/1936: 129)
4 Robert Skidelsky and Felix Martin (2012) suggest government sponsored banks along the lines 
of the European Investment Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank or the German Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau. The difference between this strategy and quantitative easing is that the funds 
would all be spent (and on approved projects).
More recently in a similar vein Robert Skidelsky and Felix 
Martin point out that
In the short run, it doesn’t matter whether the increase 
in aggregate demand takes the form of employing 
people to dig holes and fill them up again, giving 
every household a time-limited spending voucher or 
building a new railway. All that matters is that the over-
all level of spending in the economy is maintained – 
so that unemployment stops rising and with any luck, 
begins to fall again. But from any long term point of 
view, increasing aggregate demand by capital invest-
ment is better, because it creates identifiable future 
assets that promise to fund themselves and improve 
growth potential. (Skidelsky and Martin, 2012)
Capital investment could therefore take place in infra-
structure projects that generate benefits to society as a 
whole as well as for their direct users, and these benefits 
will be enduring so the projects will generate positive 
benefits into the future.
Gender bias in economic thinking
The idea that public investment should fund projects with 
enduring and widespread benefits is reflected in regu-
lations set by states or by the European Union that limit 
the permissible levels of debt and deficit, but allow these 
limits to be exceeded if the expenditure is for capital in-
vestment rather than current expenditure. The distinc-
tion between the two types of expenditure is made in the 
System of National Accounts. The first counts as capital 
stock, whereas the second is considered as government 
annual current spending, part of GDP. This distinction re-
flects a gender bias in economic thinking and account-
ing. While investment in physical infrastructure such as in 
building bridges, schools, hospitals or nurseries would be 
permitted and this would therefore include the wages of 
the builders, the funding for running the schools, hospi-
tals and nurseries, and so the wages of teachers, nurses 
and childcare workers, would not. The SNA classification 
fails to recognise the long-term productive contribution of 
the social infrastructure that employment in the teaching 
and caring industries builds, through creating and main-
taining the stock of “human capital”. 
Everyone gains from having a better educated, healthi-
er and better cared for population and society, and the 
economy will continue to benefit from today’s spending 
on health education and childcare well into the future. For 
these reasons we term this form of expenditure invest-
ment in social infrastructure. Governments began to rec-
ognise, from the mid-2000s, that spending on education 
and health could be seen as social investment because 
it improves the productive capacity of the economy, but 
they did not consider changing the accounting rules that 
would allow such expenditure to be counted as capital 
spending. Nor, indeed, did they see social care services 
in the same way, especially care for the elderly, where 
the link between spending and (re)building productive 
12|56  Investing in the Care Economy
capacity is less obvious than in the case of education.5 
Moreover this form of expenditure is rarely considered 
as a suitable form of investment when policy makers are 
looking for effective forms of employment generation in 
recessionary times. In fact the opposite has happened 
and public expenditure on education, health, childcare 
and social care services has been cut in many countries 
as part of their deficit reduction strategies, though the ex-
tent of these cuts varies between countries. 
This neglect of social infrastructure projects reflects a 
gender bias in economic thinking and may derive from 
the gender division of labour and gender employment 
segregation, with women being over represented in car-
ing work, and men over represented in construction. In-
vestment in social infrastructure is more likely to gener-
ate jobs for women while jobs generated by investment in 
physical infrastructure go largely to men. Male unemploy-
ment is often seen to be a more urgent problem as men 
are assumed to be breadwinners, despite the fact that in-
creasingly many multiple or dual person households rely 
on more than one income. However, many governments 
are committed to gender equality and in some cases have 
a legal duty to reduce gender inequalities. It is therefore 
incumbent on them to ensure that if employment genera-
tion projects are to include some that generate more jobs 
for men than women, they must at the very least counter-
balance these by other projects that generate more jobs 
for women than for men. Otherwise the gender employ-
ment gap will increase.
There is also an efficiency argument for investing in social 
infrastructure in addition to physical infrastructure as an 
employment stimulus tool. Our empirical analysis shows 
for a similar amount of investment in the caring industries 
and in the construction industries more jobs, even on a 
full time equivalent measure, are created overall – and 
the gender gap in employment reduced, not increased – 
by investing in the caring industries.
Before proceeding to our own findings, we briefly outline 
the wider case for investing in social infrastructure, as well 
as present the findings from other studies which also show 
the relative value of investment in social infrastructure.
Economic and social contributions of caring 
industries
Public investment in social infrastructure makes econom-
ic sense, as it not only generates employment, but also 
contributes to gender equality and human development 
(Antonopoulos and Kim, 2011).
The provision of collectivised care services, child and 
elder care, not only directly creates jobs in the care in-
dustry, it also frees others to take on other jobs. This is 
because collectivised modes of care provision, either in 
5 However, a long-term care system could be seen as a contract between generations and an insur-
ance system for the population as a whole to cover any care needs they might have in the future. 
Paying for such a system would then be an investment in the well-being of the whole population, who 
would be able to get on with contributing to society in other ways, reassured that their own and their 
own and their relatives’ care needs will be well provided for. 
nurseries or elder care homes, and even organised ser-
vices provided in individual homes, are generally more 
productive than individualised care within the family. In 
particular, collective care provision enables a greater la-
bour market participation of women, who in its absence 
are likely to be the ones caring at home.
Public investment in caring also contributes to resolving 
the care deficit that arises because more women are in 
paid employment than ever before but men have not in-
creased the amount of domestic work or caring they do 
sufficiently to make up the difference. Moreover, because 
of greater mobility, families are living further apart geo-
graphically, so that relying on grandparents to look after 
their grandchildren or adult children to care for their el-
derly parents intensively has become increasingly difficult.
Further, provided it is properly funded and regulated, 
public provision also contributes to the well-being of chil-
dren by increasing their learning opportunities and social 
development and integration. 
Women are more likely than men to take up jobs created 
in care services because of continuing industrial and oc-
cupational segregation. They are also more likely to be 
prepared to take employment of any type once high qual-
ity and affordable care services are available to reduce 
the unpaid care responsibilities that remain one of the 
main constraints to women’s greater participation in paid 
employment. The extent to which investment in care ser-
vices eventually reduces gender segregation will depend 
on the extent to which men are incentivised to take up 
jobs in the care sector, which improved wage conditions 
might encourage. In any case the initial effect of invest-
ing in social infrastructure would contribute to narrowing 
the gender employment gap and the gender gap in time 
devoted to unpaid care. 
Potentially public provision of care would also narrow 
social divisions by enabling low-earning women to enter 
the workforce or increase their working hours and thus 
their incomes. Without such provision low - paid women 
are deterred by the high costs of private care provision 
that higher earning women may be able to afford (Esping-
Andersen, 2009). Resulting increases in women’s lifetime 
earnings and pension entitlements would reduce the gen-
der gap in poverty rates, another contribution towards 
narrowing gendered economic inequalities. Public provi-
sion of high quality childcare can also narrow social divi-
sions if they result in children from different backgrounds 
being cared for together.
These arguments have been made by feminist econo-
mists (Elson et al., 2013), organisations such as the Wom-
en’s Budget Group in their Feminist F plan for recovery 
and supporters of the Purple Economy (Ilkkaracan, 2013), 
who also recognise that society depends on care as ‘an 
indispensable component of human well-being’ (ibid., 
p.32) so the public provision of social infrastructure is cru-
cial for economic development. 
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The idea of investment in the caring industries and so-
cial infrastructure is comparatively new but evidence of 
its effectiveness is now beginning to emerge. In addition, 
some governments have been following this approach.
From 1997 the Republic of Korea has recognised the im-
portance of investing in child care taking the view that 
early childhood education is ‘the best educational in-
vestment’ a country can make in ‘building a foundation 
of holistic development of human beings’ (Peng, 2009: 
16). In addition it was thought that such investment would 
reduce families’ financial burdens, raise women’s social 
and economic participation and that this ‘socialization of 
child and elderly care would create new economic growth 
engines’ (Ibid.: 34). In this case the government seems 
to have recognised that there can be harmony between 
economic and social objectives.
The Korean example is not isolated; the European Union 
has repeatedly argued in favour of the instrumental social 
investment state, with investment in education and health 
(and childcare) to secure the future workers’ productivity 
and thus economic competitiveness. The Barcelona Sum-
mit in 2002 set an ambitious childcare enrolment target 
for all member states to achieve by 2010; this was seen 
as a key instrument of boosting female employment (see 
country profiles). In particular Germany has stepped up 
its level of investment in childcare since the mid-2000s. 
Japan, faced with a rapidly ageing population and very 
low fertility, has also embarked on substantive reforms to 
boost childcare coverage. Long-term care on the other 
hand was somewhat left out of this vision of social invest-
ment, as the efficiency argument of boosting the produc-
tivity of its direct beneficiaries could not be made in the 
same terms even in the long-term. However provision of 
high quality adult long-term care services does contrib-
ute to the economy through improving the health and au-
tonomy not only of recipients but also of informal carers. 
Informal carers could be freed to pursue other ‘produc-
tive’ activities. High - quality care provision would keep 
all workers free from the stress of having to care for their 
elderly relatives or worrying about how their own future 
care needs would be met, thereby creating a virtuous so-
cial contract between groups and generations.
Consultants ICF GHK (2015) focused on identifying the 
economic contribution of adult social care in England. In 
this case by social care they are referring only to care for 
the elderly. They estimated the Direct Economic Value of 
the Sector itself, the Indirect Economic Value as a conse-
quence of the demand it generates for goods and servic-
es from other sectors, and, finally the Induced Economic 
Value as a consequence of all these workers spending 
their earnings. 
Gender sensitive socially 
inclusive macroeconomic 
policies make economic sense: 
findings from existing research 
evidence
Photo: ILO
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They found that including all these effects the social care 
sector leads to 1.5 million workers (1.3 million full time 
equivalent, which is 6.4% of the workforce) being em-
ployed and generates Gross Value Added (GVA) of £20 
billion or 1.8 % of total national output. This overall number 
of employees is marginally higher than the numbers gen-
erated by construction, transportation or public adminis-
tration. In addition the social care sector generates more 
GVA than the legal sector, the production and distribution 
of electricity and gas or the arts, entertainment and rec-
reation industries. The point of the analysis, which was 
carried out for an employer-led agency, was to highlight 
the comparative significance of social care.
Using a parallel form of analysis to our own empirical in-
vestigation, Rania Antonopoulos and Kijong Kim (2011) 
investigate the effects of investment in social care (by 
which they mean child care and social care for the el-
derly), in South Africa and the United States. As part of 
their analysis they estimate the impact of an investment 
equivalent to 1% of GDP in social care compared to a simi-
lar investment in physical infrastructure and calculate the 
direct and indirect employment impact (but not induced 
effects), and the distribution of these jobs by gender and 
income group. 
In both countries they find that the number of jobs cre-
ated by investment in social care is approximately twice 
as many as those generated by a similar level of invest-
ment in physical infrastructure, in line with our results for 
the US.6 They also find that the gender composition of 
the jobs fits the stereotypical pattern with the jobs gen-
erated by investment in social care being disproportion-
ately taken by women and the physical infrastructure jobs 
being taken by men. What is particularly striking in the 
South African simulation is that women take only 55% of 
the jobs generated by investment in social care – taking 
directly and indirectly generated jobs together. In com-
parison women take only 18% of the jobs generated by 
investment in physical infrastructure. Thus while most of 
the jobs directly created in social care go to women, in 
this case jobs for men are also created to a greater extent 
following investment in social care than in physical infra-
structure7. 
Such findings are supported by the work of Hannah Bar-
gawi and Giovanni Cozzi (2014) — using the Cambridge-
Alphametrics macro-simulation Model (CAM). Their study 
investigates the feasibility of alternatives to austerity for 
the Eurozone. They find that it is possible to have eco-
nomic growth, an expansion of employment (with a bias 
towards female employment) and yet lower the public 
debt and deficits. Indeed, this model estimates that a 
gender-sensitive macroeconomic scenario based on an 
expansion of government investment and expenditure 
and targeted at female employment would produce bet-
ter outcomes in terms of EU economic and social objec-
6 Specifically their results come from ex-ante policy simulation results. Both social accounting matrix-
based multiplier analysis and propensity ranking-based microsimulation provide evidence of the pro-
poor impacts of the social care expansion.
7 Since for every 100 jobs created in physical infrastructure (82 for men), 200 are created in social care 
(and thus 45%*200=90 for men).
tives than the ‘business-as-usual’ approach of pursuing 
austerity. More specifically, they find that investment that 
specifically targeted female employment would result in 
higher levels of employment overall, higher levels of eco-
nomic growth and a greater reduction in debt as well as 
greater reductions in the employment gap between men 
and women. 
So there is growing evidence to suggest that it is possible 
to have gender sensitive policies and economic growth 
– indeed these findings suggest that gender equitable 
policies that contribute to human development also make 
economic sense. Our empirical analysis that follows in-
vestigates this idea further by contrasting the differential 
impact of public investment in social infrastructure com-
pared to physical infrastructure for seven OECD countries. 
Photo: www.nurses-forum.com
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Overview of the countries 
studied
Table 1 Summary indicators of childcare provision
 
ECEC Chi 0-5 Children 0-2 Children 3-5
Public spending 
% GDP
Public spending 
% GDP
Enrolment 
% chi
Average 
hours
Enrolment 
% chi Average hours
Australia 0.38 0.59 31 22 65 13
Denmark 1.51 1.51 74 35 96 34
Germany 0.49 0.49 24 30 94 28
Italy 0.62 0.62 26 31 95 33
Japan 0.13 0.13 26 35 89 25
United Kingdom 0.44 0.82 35 14 94 20
United States 0.37 0.37 26 32 70 32
Notes: (1) OECD family database figures on public spending for Japan (0.45), UK (1.1) and Denmark (2.0) are higher because they include spending on social services and child protection. (2) Figures 
for Australia and UK in second column include primary education spending for children aged 5. 
Source: see Appendix 1 for country profiles.
Care systems
A summary of each country’s care regime is provided in 
Appendix 1. Overall, the seven countries chosen for this 
analysis differ in the extent to which the state intervenes 
directly in providing care services for its population, both 
for preschool children and for adults needing help with 
daily activities. Following the traditional welfare regime 
typology identified in the literature, Denmark stands out 
from the pack for having a well developed, social-dem-
ocratic provision of care services that are affordable, 
publicly-run or subsidised and of high quality and reach. 
The UK, Australia and the US, usually classified as liberal 
regimes, do not provide substantial state services and 
when they have financial support in place, it tends to be 
by using transfers to families or care recipients to pur-
chase services on the market. Germany, Japan and Italy – 
not always grouped together in welfare regime analyses 
depending on the range of social policies that are consid-
ered – have traditionally relied on family members (mainly 
women) to provide care to children and elderly at home. 
These informal carers are untrained but not always un-
paid; some financial support for stay-at-home carers has 
been made available, especially in Germany. However, 
in recent years, Germany and Japan have implemented 
social insurance systems to provide for long-term care, 
while investing directly in the provision of childcare ser-
vices, while Italy only pushed for more public services in 
childcare.
In all countries but Denmark the provision of care remains 
insufficient and many women still provide the bulk of care 
to both adults and children. Affordability of care and thus 
access for low income families is the main issue in the UK 
and the US, although in some cases availability of servic-
es, especially of childcare, is also of major concern. In the 
other countries it is more an issue of availability of places 
and opening hours rather than fees, as existing services 
are better subsidised but are scarce.
Table 1 shows figures for public spending on childcare 
and enrolment rates for children under the age of five. In 
all countries enrolment rates reflect availability of spaces, 
as there is excess demand. Enrolment rates for children 
aged 3-5 are considerably higher than for children aged 
0-2. Note that, for Australia and the UK, average weekly 
hours of use of childcare for both age groups is consider-
ably lower than in other countries.
Note that we do not have data for private spending on 
childcare, although the totals in the first two columns of 
Table 1 include public cash transfers (childcare subsi-
dies) to parents to pay for private childcare services. Out 
of pocket remaining fees vary from 0% of a typical dual-
earner family’s net income in Denmark and Germany to 
50% in the US (OECD Family Database, 2014).
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Spending on adult long-term care is more difficult to estimate, so Table 2 provides a summary of different sources and 
the combined estimate of public spending on long-term care services. Public spending on long-term care services 
constitutes a larger share of GDP than childcare services. Note that private spending (households’ out-of-pocket 
spending), as measured in the OECD social expenditure database and the Eurostat health expenditure database, is 
lower than public expenditure. As detailed in the country profiles in Appendix 1, the majority of long-term care is still 
provided by informal unpaid carers, mainly the partner or child(ren) of the person in need. In Denmark, 52% of de-
pendents did not use any formal LTC services in 2010 compared with 72% in Germany, 74% in the UK and 76% in Italy 
(Lipszyc et al., 2012).
Table 2 Public and private spending on long-term care (various sources)
 
OECD SOCX Eurostat Lipszyc et al. 2012 Estimate
LTC 2011 LTC 2011 LTC 2010 LTC 2011
Public  
in-kind  
% GDP
Private  
in-kind  
% GDP
Public 
 in-kind  
% GDP
Private  
in-kind  
% GDP
Public  
in-kind  
% GDP
Public 
cash  
% GDP
Public in-
kind  
% GDP
Australia 0.887 0.005 0.10 0.01 - - 0.80
Denmark 2.300 0.185 2.35 0.19 2.47 2.04 2.35
Germany 1.545 0.524 1.02 0.39 0.98 0.45 1.02
Italy - - - - 1.04 0.86 1.04
Japan 0.781 0.129 1.87 0.23 - - 1.87
United Kingdom - - - - 1.42 0.56 1.42
United States 0.578 0.384 0.57 0.39 - - 0.57
Source: see Appendix 1 for country profiles
As in the case of childcare, Denmark stands out by spending proportionately much more on long-term care than other 
countries, followed by Japan. In Japan, a large share of public spending is directed towards the social component of 
the long-term care services (that is help with instrumental activities such as cleaning and cooking) as opposed to the 
health component of nursing care (including personal hygiene), which constitutes the bulk of public spending in most 
countries. 
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Table 3 Main labour market indicators
Empl. rate 15-64 
(Q4 2014)
PT frequency 
(2014)
Unempl. Rate (Q4 
2014)
Gender wage gap 
(2013)  
(FT employees)
Empl. rate of mothers 
15-64 (youngest child 
0-5) (2013)
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Australia 77.1% 66.1% 14.0% 38.3% 6.3% 6.4% 18.0 51%
Denmark 76.1% 71.0% 14.6% 25.4% 6.6% 6.4% 7.8 77.7%
Germany 78.1% 69.7% 9.1% 37.5% 5.4% 4.6% 16.6 61.9%
Italy 64.8% 46.9% 8.6% 32.9% 12.1% 14.4% 11.1 52.2%
Japan 81.6% 64.2% 12.0% 37.2% 3.8% 3.4% 26.6 42.9%
UK 77.0% 67.6% 11.7% 38.1% 6% 5.5% 17.5 60.6%
US 73.9% 63.3% 8.0% 16.8% 5.9% 5.7% 17.9 58.6%
Notes: source is OECD employment database and family database. Maternal employment rate for Japan is for women aged 25-54 and for the year 2010.
Care employment
Table 4 below shows the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees in the two industries considered for this 
analysis and overall, the percentage of the total who are employed in each industry, as well as the proportions of em-
ployees in each industry who are women.
Table 4 Employment in care and construction
 
 
No. FTE employees (000s) % of total (FTE) % women (HC)
All Constr. Care Constr. Care Constr. Care
Australia 8807.1 703.8 400.9 8.0% 4.6% 11% 79%
Denmark 1752.7 112.4 200.6 6.4% 11.4% 8% 81%
Germany 29747.4 1982.9 1380.9 6.7% 4.6% 13% 75%
Italy 15566.1 1135.6 337.7 7.3% 2.2% 6% 85%
Japan 46932.7 4775.0 2224.3 10.2% 4.7% 14% 77%
UK 21580.5 1284.4 1301.1 6.0% 6.0% 11% 80%
US 122269.0 5903.0 5116.0 4.8% 4.2% 13% 81%
Source: See Appendix 3
Labour markets
In part reflecting differences in care provision, the employment patterns of men and women in the seven countries 
studied show that both more employment and greater hours of employment could be achieved. This is especially 
the case for women, whose employment rate lags behind that of men by between 6.5 percentage points in Denmark 
and more than 20 percentage points in Italy and Japan (Table 3). Women are more likely to work part-time and earn 
less per hour than men in all countries, again with marked variations between care regimes. In no country has gender 
equality of employment, not just in terms of overall rates but also quality and working conditions, been achieved.
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Table 5 shows the compensation per FTE employee for 
each industry (as a proportion of the average compensa-
tion per employee across all industries) and the ratio of 
average compensation in the two industries. It shows that 
in four countries (Australia, Germany, Denmark and Italy) 
employees in the care industry are only slightly less well 
paid than in the construction industry, and they are better 
paid in Japan. However they all get a lower compensation 
than the national average except in Australia. By contrast, 
in the UK and the US, employees in the care industry are 
paid about half of what construction workers are paid and 
far less than the national average.
Table 5 Compensation of employees per FTE (% of 
average compensation)
Constr. Care Ratio care/cons.
Australia 108% 106% 97%
Denmark 90% 85% 94%
Germany 79% 70% 88%
Italy 76% 69% 90%
Japan 73% 81% 112%
UK 100% 44% 44%
US 70% 38% 54%
Source: see Appendix 3
Appendix 3 gives an overview of the occupational com-
position of the main care industries for some countries. 
Although care industries in most countries have a vari-
ety of occupations with different qualifications, data for 
the US and Japan show that care-related occupations ac-
count for a large majority of employment in these indus-
tries (above two-third, including nurses and healthcare 
professionals).
Table 6 shows the average earnings in selected care 
work occupations compared with that of registered nurs-
es and primary education teachers. Data could only be 
found for four countries (see Appendix 4 for more detail). 
Care workers in all four countries are paid well below the 
national average, and earnings do not differ much be-
tween childcare and long-term care workers. Note that 
both sorts of care workers in Australia are paid much less 
than the national average unlike, as Table 4 above shows, 
other workers in the care industry. Note also that the dif-
ference in pay between care workers and qualified nurs-
es and primary school teachers is particularly large in the 
US and relatively small in Denmark. 
Table 6 Earnings in care occupations (% of average 
earnings in all occupations)
 
Nurses Teachers 
(primary)
Child-
care 
workers
Long-
term care 
workers
Australia (All) 103 108 45 57
Denmark  
(Full-time) 97 99 67 73
UK (All) 104 113 45 55
US  (Full-time) 138 124 56 55
Source: See Appendix 4 (average weekly earnings of employees; for Denmark, monthly 
earnings)
Working conditions in the care industry, characterised by 
unpredictability of working hours (especially for long-term 
care occupations), tiring shifts, low pay and irregular work 
contribute to problems of recruitment and retention, put-
ting pressure on the overall quality of care services de-
spite workers’ commitment to delivering high standards 
(OECD, 2011a; EC, 2014).
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The analysis that follows assesses the total employment 
generating effects of investing in physical and social in-
frastructure, and the gender breakdown of these effects. 
Using input-output tables and other official statistics8, we 
calculate9 the direct, indirect and induced employment ef-
fects of an investment equal to 2% of GDP made to either 
the care or the construction sector10, taking these two 
sectors as typical examples of where social and physical 
infrastructure investment is made, respectively. We also 
look at the gendered breakdown of each of these em-
ployment effects.
Calculating total employment effects that include indirect 
and induced effects can be done by using input-output 
tables provided by national statistical offices. These ta-
bles show how industries are linked in the supply chain 
of goods and services that eventually meet final house-
hold, government and export demand. Input-output ta-
bles show how much output of each other industry (and 
how much of its own output) each industry’s production 
process uses as inputs. We can add information on how 
much labour is used in the production process of each in-
dustry, and express all information as input requirements 
per unit of each industry’s output. (Note that the way this 
is used assumes that these requirements do not change 
with the scale of demand for an industry’s output.)
How much direct employment can be created by invest-
ment in a given industry depends on how much labour 
its production process requires and on the costs of em-
ploying that labour (employee remuneration, employers’ 
social security contributions and other costs). Indirect ef-
fects are calculated for each industry by using the I-O ta-
bles to calculate total input requirements down the supply 
chain (including imported components) for the production 
of one unit of output of that industry. Total (direct and indi-
rect) employment (also known as Type I) effects are then 
the total of these inputs, each multiplied by employment 
per unit of output in its production process. We then ob-
tain the indirect employment effect for each industry by 
subtracting its direct employment effect, as calculated 
above. 
8 For statistical sources: see Appendix 3
9 For methodology: see Appendix 2
10 The exact definition of these two sectors varies across countries: see Appendix 3
Simulating direct, indirect and 
induced employment effects of 
public investment
Calculating the induced employment effect follows a similar 
method, only that the input-output tables are augmented in 
a different way, this time with information about household 
expenditure patterns. Households are effectively treated as 
another industry, using inputs produced by all industries but 
producing no output, whose level of expenditure depends 
on total household income, which is in turn determined by 
the total level of employment. Any additional employment 
then generates increased household income and thus in-
duced demand which itself travels through the supply chain 
generating direct and indirect employment effects. This 
gives for any additional investment total (direct, indirect and 
induced) employment (also known as Type II) effects, from 
which the induced effects can be isolated by subtracting the 
direct and indirect (Type I) effects, as calculated above.
Deriving employment effects by gender is achieved by ap-
plying the proportions of men and women in each industry 
found in the latest employment surveys. As at all steps in 
this analysis, this makes the assumption that current pro-
portions do not change as a result of such investments.
A more detailed explanation of the method used for our 
analysis is outlined in Appendix 2. The reference year of 
the input-output tables is 2010 for the UK, Italy and Ger-
many, 2011 for Denmark and Japan, 2012 for Australia and 
2013 for the US.
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Direct Effects
Table 7 gives the direct employment effects by country, that is, the number of new jobs directly generated by an equiva-
lent investment in the construction or the care industries. Since countries differ in the size of their working age popu-
lation, the easiest way to compare effects is to give the numbers of newly employed people as a percentage of each 
country‘s working-age population (15-64 years), that is, the percentage points by which its employment rate would rise. 
It can be easily seen from Table 7 that the direct employ-
ment effects of an investment in care are considerably 
larger than those of an equivalent investment in construc-
tion. There are a number of reasons why this is to be ex-
pected. First, care is a far more labour intensive industry 
than construction, which uses a number of inputs other 
than labour, whereas the majority of the costs of provid-
ing care consist of care workers’ wages and relatively lit-
tle equipment and raw materials are needed. Second, in 
some countries but not all, workers in the care industry (in 
particular those providing care directly) are paid less than 
many construction workers. This is only marginally true in 
most countries, except in the UK and the US where there 
is a large difference in wage levels and a given amount of 
money will employ considerably more care workers than 
construction workers. Finally, care workers are employed 
on average for shorter hours than construction workers, 
since many care workers are employed part-time or for 
variable hours (e.,g., on zero - hours contracts). Much re-
mains to be done to improve the quality of jobs for care 
workers, particularly women.
The third column under each industry allows for this last 
difference by looking at the number of full-time equiva-
lent jobs (FTEs) created under our simulation’s assump-
tion that the employment structure in each sector remains 
unchanged. Under this assumption, even in terms of FTE 
jobs directly generated, investment in care still clearly 
outperforms investment in construction.11
11 Note that for the US calculations we used the number of jobs rather than the number of people 
employed, therefore marginally overestimating the employment rate effects. Also, FTE jobs couldn’t 
be calculated for all industries by gender so that only direct effect overall is shown here and the re-
mainder of the US analysis uses headcount figures only. 
Table 7 Direct employment effects 
  Construction Care
Number of jobs 
generated
Rise in head-
count employ-
ment rate (% 
points)
Number of FTE 
jobs generated
Number of 
jobs generated
Rise in employ-
ment rate (% 
points)
Number of FTE 
jobs generated
Australia 74,791 0.5 68,859 356,812 2.3 269,842
Denmark 29,380 0.8 22,989 75,228 2.1 47,359
Germany 504,181 0.9 476,299 1,402,416 2.6 1,125,163
Italy 230,904 0.6 224,297 562,869 1.4 508,276
Japan 1,143,819 1.4 1,052,666 1,612,291 2.0 1,313,488
UK 300,787 0.7 287,436 746,409 1.8 608,320
US 2,575,090 1.2 2,510,713 7,146,507 3.4 5,511,897
However, in practice such a massive investment in a sec-
tor is likely to have considerable effects on working con-
ditions (and pay) within the sector, particularly a sector 
that is already experiencing recruitment and retention 
problems due to poor pay and conditions as discussed 
above. If this is the case then, while the total amount of 
employment generated in the care industry may be re-
duced, the jobs will be of higher quality. 
An increase in investment in either sector may also lead 
to the substitution of capital for labour i.,e., the use of la-
bour saving technology. Unlike the considerable scope 
for labour-saving technology in construction, its use is 
inherently limited in care, albeit there is some scope that 
increased investment may encourage for its use in moni-
toring and communication. In this case our results may 
again overestimate the number of jobs generated, but will 
do so more for the construction sector than for the care 
sector. Investment in care will continue to have a consid-
erably higher direct employment effect so long as it re-
mains more labour intensive than construction, and the 
wages of care workers do not overtake those of construc-
tion workers, even if employment conditions in the two 
sectors were to start converging. 
There is some variation between countries in the size of 
these effects, with the direct employment effects of in-
vestment ranging from half of a percentage point in Aus-
tralia to 1.4 percentage points in Japan. The range is even 
bigger for the care sector, ranging from less than 2 per-
centage points in Italy and the UK to more than 3 percent-
age points in the US. 
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Care is almost as gender segregated but in the oppo-
site direction. The direct effect of investing in care would 
therefore be to reduce the gender gap in employment for 
the economy as a whole. The investment in care would 
result in an increase in the employment rate of women 
of between 2.4 and 5.5 percentage points, while for men 
that rise of between 0.4 and 1.3 percentage points is con-
siderably smaller in all countries (though still larger than 
that for women of investing in construction), reducing 
every country’s gender gap in employment by at least 2 
percentage points. That the direct effect of investment 
in care on women’s employment rate is so much greater 
than that of investment in construction on men’s employ-
ment rate simply reflects the former’s greater direct em-
ployment effect discussed above. Challenging gender 
segregation in every industry is an important contribution 
to promoting gender equality, and getting more men into 
caring occupations has been seen as desirable in itself. 
However, as our results show, if that gender difference 
persisted, investment in care would remain a highly effec-
tive way of narrowing the overall gender gap in employ-
ment.
But there are good reasons to think that if an investment 
of this magnitude was made, the female domination of 
the care sector might be reduced. The better wages and 
working conditions that would be necessary to achieve 
such an investment in care would be likely to attract more 
men into the industry, particularly if policies were in place 
to encourage and facilitate their entry. In this case invest-
ment in care would have a beneficial effect on a wider 
range of gender inequalities: it would reduce occupa-
tional segregation by gender and the gender pay gap; it 
would also still make the gender employment gap smaller 
though perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent than the 
estimates of the gendered direct employment effects in 
Table 8 suggest.  
Table 8 Gendered direct employment effects 
  Construction Care
% of jobs gen-
erated taken by 
women
Rise in em-
ployment rate 
of women (% 
points)
Rise in employ-
ment rate of 
men (% points)
% of jobs gen-
erated taken by 
women
Rise in em-
ployment rate 
of women (% 
points)
Rise in employ-
ment rate of 
men (% points)
Australia 11% 0.1 0.9 79% 3.7 1.0
Denmark 8% 0.2 1.5 81% 3.4 0.7
Germany 13% 0.2 1.6 75% 3.9 1.3
Italy 6% 0.1 1.1 85% 2.4 0.4
Japan 14% 0.4 2.4 77% 3.1 0.9
UK 11% 0.2 1.3 80% 2.9 0.7
US 13% 0.3 2.1 81% 5.5 1.3
What counts as a direct employment effect partly depends on the internal contracting structure of an industry; where 
workers are indirectly employed through contracting out their employment will appear as an indirect effect. So some 
of variation in the size of direct employment effects could be a result of the internal structure of the industries varying 
across countries. Outsourcing within the industry will reduce direct employment effects but will increase indirect ef-
fects, as will become clear below when we discuss indirect employment effects. 
Table 8 shows that the direct gender employment effects of investment in the two industries are quite different. Both 
industries are heavily gender segregated, particularly construction. As a result only 6-14% of the jobs directly gener-
ated in construction would go to women in our simulation. Note, however, that the simulation assumes that the male 
domination of the construction is not challenged in the course of increasing investment in it (see Appendix 2). Any 
government looking to reduce gender inequalities would presumably attempt to change that male domination in mak-
ing such an investment. Without doing so successfully, the gender gap in employment for the economy as a whole 
would increase with an investment in construction. This can be seen from Table 8 where the investment in construc-
tion results in a direct rise in men’s employment rate of between 0.9 and 2.4 percentage points, while for women a 
direct rise of between 0.1 and 0.4 percentage points is all that can be expected.
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Indirect effects
Investment in any industry will generate additional indirect employment effects as demand is increased for the prod-
ucts of its suppliers. Such demand and employment effects will ripple down the supply chain, generating indirect 
employment effects in many industries (including within the industry/ies in which the original investment was made). 
We do not here present the division between indirect effects that are within each industry itself, and those that are 
outside effects on other industries, but as noted above it should be borne in mind that the distinction between direct 
and indirect within industry employment effects depends on the internal contracting structure of an industry. All other 
things being equal, industries that engage in more internal subcontracting will have higher indirect effects and lower 
direct effects than industries that tend to employ labour directly.
In most countries, the indirect employment effects of investment in construction are larger than those in care. This is to 
be expected, since construction uses more inputs provided by other industries than a labour intensive industry such as 
care. Two outliers are worth discussing at this point: the care effect for the UK and the construction effect for Australia.
Table 9 Indirect employment effects through the supply chain
  Construction Care
Number of jobs 
generated
Rise in headcount 
employment rate 
(% points)
Number of 
FTE jobs 
generated
Number of jobs 
generated
Rise in employ-
ment rate (% 
points)
Number of 
FTE jobs 
generated
Australia 180,087 1.2 161,816 40,663 0.3 34,525
Denmark 18,135 0.5 13,873 10,744 0.3 7,511
Germany 263,281 0.5 236,188 185,001 0.3 159,437
Italy 265,789 0.7 250,276 188,437 0.5 171,133
Japan 598,642 0.7 524,557 378,888 0.5 142,668
UK 231,389 0.6 213,572 509,528 1.2 420,673
US 1,426,866 0.7 n/a 1,326,773 0.6 n/a
Our calculations identified that the UK has a much larger indirect effect, nearly all of which (0.8 percentage points) 
is due to indirect employment effects within the care sector. The UK’s care industry’s indirect employment effect on 
other industries at 0.4 percentage points is similar to that of other countries. This suggests that the care sector in the 
UK outsources a larger proportion of its inputs within itself than the care sector in other countries (and indeed than the 
construction sector in many countries). One possible explanation for this is the recent intense privatisation of care in 
the UK – such restructuring may lead to greater outsourcing and contracting through agencies. This is consistent with 
a direct employment effect in the UK that is lower than most, so that the sum of total within-industry effects (both direct 
and indirect) is in the middle of its range over the countries studied. Total employment effects will be analysed below.
The other outlier is Australia, whose residential construction sector generates particularly large indirect employment 
effects (and the lowest direct employment effect). This seems to reflect recent changes in the Australian construction 
industry that saw increases in outsourcing to specialised trades in other industries and sub-contracting between firms 
within the construction sector (Toner, 2006).
Table 10 shows the gender breakdown of these indirect employment effects.
It is striking that the indirect employment generated by the construction industry is still male-dominated, though less 
so than its direct employment. For the care industry that is not the case. Indeed the balance of indirect employment 
generated favours men somewhat, except in the UK, whose large indirect effect is primarily within the care sector 
itself, which as we know is female-dominated.
As a result the indirect employment effects of investment in construction raise men’s employment rate more than 
women’s, increasing the gender employment gap. In most countries the rise in the gender employment gap is by 
between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points, but in Australia it is by a whole percentage point. Successful efforts to tackle 
the male domination of the construction industry’s suppliers, as well as that of industry itself, would be necessary to 
mitigate these effects.
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Table 11 Induced employment effects through household spending 
  Construction Care
Number of jobs 
generated
Rise in head-
count em-
ployment rate 
(% points)
Number of 
FTE jobs 
generated
Number of 
jobs generated
Rise in employment 
rate (% points)
Number of FTE 
jobs generated
Australia 132,574 0.9 109,626 216,122 1.4 178,713
Denmark 20,896 0.6 13,745 31,153 0.9 20,491
Germany 272,570 0.5 232,887 432,368 0.8 369,420
Italy 123,880 0.3 112,332 194,350 0.5 176,233
Japan 1,350,489 1.7 1,140,271 1,478,403 1.8 1,242,336
UK 212,468 0.5 181,581 292,151 0.7 249,680
US 3,444,418 1.6 n/a 4,438,219 2.1 n/a
Table 10 Gendered indirect employment effects 
  Construction Care
% of jobs gen-
erated taken by 
women
Rise in employment 
rate of women (% 
points)
Rise in employ-
ment rate of 
men (% points)
% of jobs gen-
erated taken by 
women
Rise in em-
ployment rate 
of women (% 
points)
Rise in em-
ployment 
rate of men 
(% points)
Australia 30% 0.7 1.7 42% 0.3 0.3
Denmark 31% 0.3 0.7 42% 0.3 0.3
Germany 33% 0.3 0.6 50% 0.3 0.3
Italy 24% 0.3 1.0 53% 0.5 0.4
Japan 34% 0.5 1.0 42% 0.5 0.5
UK 23% 0.2 0.9 67% 1.2 0.8
US 37% 0.5 0.9 43% 0.6 0.7
Induced effects
Besides indirect effects there are also induced employment effects as a result of the additional household income 
generated by the additional employment. Some of this additional household income will be spent and become a fur-
ther source of increased demand within the economy, generating jobs in the sectors in which households spend their 
income.
Table 11 shows these induced effects. Note that these effects are more controversial and some national statistical of-
fices do not calculate them. We have included them because when calculated they often turn out to be substantial, but 
they are given here with the proviso that their magnitude must be taken as somewhat approximate. One reason for this 
caution is that we have had to treat all household income as being spent in the same way, as is the usual practice by 
those statistical offices that do calculate induced effects12. Ideally, for the purpose of comparing the effects of invest-
ment in two different sectors, we would have liked to be able to consider the spending propensities of different types of 
households and the likely distribution of construction and care workers (and those indirectly employed) among such 
households. To do so would have required analysing micro-level household expenditure data, which was beyond the 
scope of this project, although we can comment on the likely direction in which our estimates of induced employment 
effects might move if such micro-level analysis were to be carried out.
12 We have broadly followed the methodology of National Statistics Scotland, adapting it where necessary to the data limitations of particular countries. For further details, see Appendix 2: Methodology 
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The induced effects of investment in the care sector are larger than those of the construction sector simply because 
the former raises total household income more. This is because the larger overall employment effects must outweigh 
the lower pay of the care sector. Another way to interpret the relative rise in total household income is that it shows the 
care industry to be using fewer imports directly and indirectly than the construction industry, so that a larger propor-
tion of the employment creation of investment in care stays within the domestic economy. 
Since lower income households are likely to have a greater propensity to spend any additional income, our method-
ology, by treating all household income as spent in the same way, will in practice underestimate the employment-
inducing effects of investment that results in an increase in earnings going to lower income households. As Table 5 
shows, only In Australia are care and construction workers paid above average wages, and in the UK construction 
workers receive average wages. In all other countries workers in both sectors receive below average wages, and in 
the US and the UK care workers are on average paid particularly poorly and thus are more likely to live in lower income 
households, all else equal. We can therefore assume that the propensity to consume and therefore induced employed 
effects might in general be somewhat greater than those given in Table 11, and particularly for employment generated 
by investment in the care industry in the US and the UK.
Table 12 shows clearly that the induced effects do not have a specifically gendered character, simply reflecting the 
roughly equal gender composition breakdown of employment in the sectors producing the goods and services that 
households purchase. 
It also reveals how the only difference in the induced effects of the investment between the two industries that our 
methodology can pick up is one of scale. Induced effects, as calculated here, are simply proportional to the total ad-
ditional wage bill paid through the direct and indirect employment effects. However, in reality there is good reason 
to think that the induced effects might not be proportional, once we take account of most care workers being women 
and thus in practice more likely than construction workers to need to spend money to replace their own unpaid labour 
if they take a job or increase their hours of employment. Particularly where the unpaid labour is replaced by services, 
as it must be to meet domestic care responsibilities, that money will be spent in ways that generate local employment. 
This is more likely to be the case in countries where care is not well subsidised and remain expensive for users, as in 
the UK and the US (at least for childcare as the country profiles show).
For this reason it is likely that the induced effects of investment in care are somewhat underestimated and in particular 
underestimated relative to those of investment in construction.
  Construction Care
% of jobs gen-
erated taken 
by women
Rise in employment 
rate of women (% 
points)
Rise in employ-
ment rate of 
men (% points)
% of jobs gen-
erated taken by 
women
Rise in em-
ployment rate 
of women (% 
points)
Rise in em-
ployment 
rate of men 
(% points)
Australia 49% 0.9 0.9 49% 1.4 1.5
Denmark 47% 0.5 0.6 47% 0.8 0.9
Germany 51% 0.5 0.5 51% 0.8 0.8
Italy 44% 0.3 0.3 44% 0.5 0.5
Japan 43% 1.4 1.9 44% 1.8 2.0
UK 46% 0.5 0.6 46% 0.7 0.8
US 52% 1.7 1.6 52% 2.1 2.0
Table 12 Gendered induced employment effects
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Total effects
It is the total employment effects that matter in understanding how investment can be used to generate employment. 
Table 13 gives these by summing the above direct, indirect and induced employment effects.
We can see that in all countries the employment inducing effect of investment in care is higher than that of an equiva-
lent investment in construction, at least 50% higher in all countries except Japan, where construction has unusually 
large employment generating effects (both direct and indirect). In Italy the effects for both sectors are smaller (more 
so for care) than for other countries with both direct and induced effects amongst the smallest. This is in part due 
to a larger proportion of full-time employment than in other countries. In full-time equivalents, Denmark has a lower 
overall rise in employment rate than Italy for example (2.1 versus 2.2). Another reason might be that because social 
care in Italy is so underdeveloped, especially as formal at-home care is virtually inexistent, the more capital intensive 
residential care might feature more prominently in relative terms in official statistics and thus the employment effect is 
lower in Italy than say, Germany, where relative wages are of the same magnitude (Table 5). It is unlikely that the input-
output tables capture the contribution of the grey economy, which is widely developed in Italy’s social care system13.
Table 13 Total employment effects
  Construction Care
Number of jobs 
generated
Rise in head-
count employ-
ment rate  
(% points)
Number of 
FTE jobs 
generated
Number of jobs 
generated
Rise in employment 
rate (% points)
Number of 
FTE jobs gen-
erated
Australia 387,452 2.5 340,300 613,597 4.0 483,080
Denmark 68,412 1.9 50,607 117,124 3.2 75,361
Germany 1,040,031 1.9 945,373 2,019,786 3.7 1,654,019
Italy 620,573 1.6 586,905 945,655 2.4 855,642
Japan 3,092,950 3.8 2,717,494 3,469,582 4.3 2,877,691
UK 744,644 1.8 682,588 1,548,087 3.7 1,278,673
US 7,446,375 3.5 n/a 12,911,500 6.1 n/a
13 See more details and sources in the country profile in Appendix 1.
26|56  Investing in the Care Economy
Further as Table 14 shows, the employment effects of investing in care would also reduce the gender employment gap 
by having a stronger effect on women’s employment rate than on men’s. Table 15 shows what the employment gap is 
in each country and by how much it would be reduced or increased by each type of investment.
Table 14 Gendered total employment effects
  Construction Care
% of jobs 
generated 
taken by 
women
rise in employ-
ment rate of 
women  
(% points)
rise in employ-
ment rate of men 
(% points)
% of jobs gen-
erated taken by 
women
rise in em-
ployment rate 
of women (% 
points)
rise in employ-
ment rate of men 
(% points)
Australia 33% 1.7 3.4 66% 5.3 2.8
Denmark 27% 1.0 2.7 69% 4.5 2.0
Germany 28% 1.1 2.8 68% 5.1 2.4
Italy 21% 0.7 2.5 70% 3.3 1.4
Japan 30% 2.3 5.3 59% 5.1 3.4
UK 24% 0.9 2.7 69% 5.1 2.3
US 35% 2.5 4.6 67% 8.2 4.0
Table 15 Gender employment gap and effects on it of investment of 2% of GDP in Construction or Care 
Industries 
  Construction Care
Existing gender 
employment 
gap
Percentage point 
change in gender 
employment gap
As % of existing 
gender employment 
gap
Percentage point 
change in gender 
employment gap
As % of existing gen-
der employment gap
Australia 12.2 1.8 15% -2.6 -21%
Denmark 6.5 1.7 26% -2.5 -38%
Germany 9.4 1.7 18% -2.7 -29%
Italy 21.1 1.8 9% -1.9 -9%
Japan 23.1 2.9 13% -1.6 -7%
UK 9.9 1.8 18% -2.8 -28%
US 8.7 2.1 24% -4.2 -48%
While investment in construction increases the gender employment gap, investment in care decreases it substan-
tially while increasing both women’s and men’s employment rates. The relative reduction is strongest in the US and 
Denmark where existing employment gaps are the lowest whereas the gaps are least reduced in Italy and Japan 
where they are the largest of the seven countries studied.
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This analysis does not show that investment in construc-
tion is not worthwhile. Rather that since at least as large 
employment effects can also be generated by investment 
in care, with particularly beneficial gender equality ef-
fects, the mix of investment has to depend on what ben-
efit the results of each type of investment would in itself 
generate for society. It can no longer be made simply on 
the grounds that investing in physical infrastructure is the 
best way to stimulate employment. 
Reducing the employment gap is not the only gender ine-
quality that could be improved through investment in care. 
Wages and working conditions in the care industry would 
have to improve considerably if such an investment were 
to be successful, given existing retention and recruitment 
problems in the industry. Such investment would there-
fore have to entail training and professionalization, which 
would be of benefit not only to care workers but to the 
people that they care for. Achieving high quality care is a 
gender issue in its own right, since women predominate 
among one significant section of care recipients, the el-
derly. 
Once basic needs are met, investment in care may result 
in more jobs being created to extend coverage in terms of 
hours of care, raise staff/client ratios and improve training. 
Better training would also result in wages being increased, 
which should also improve care standards, particularly 
for those with particular types of care needs.  Even in 
Denmark, where this exercise may seem irrelevant given 
that most needs for social and childcare are covered (at 
least in terms of the numbers of children and adults in 
need of care who are being formally looked after), there 
is still scope for improvement. So we might expect that 
any additional employment created by investment in care 
in Denmark would improve quality rather than coverage, 
with increased staff ratios and better working conditions. 
In particular Denmark’s social care system has high turno-
ver owing to difficult working conditions, as in other coun-
tries, despite its well-developed system that seems to 
provide for all critical needs (Schultz, 2014).
The benefits of care provision in itself are considered 
elsewhere in this report. That in itself makes the strongest 
case for investing in care. But the employment effects are 
considerable too, and their substantial effects on gender 
inequalities reinforce that argument. 
Summary of employment and growth 
effects
Figures 1 and 2 below summarise the employment effects 
that have been discussed in detail above.
Figure 1 Contribution of men’s and women’s 
employment to the rise in employment rates by 
industry and country
Figure 2 Contribution of direct, indirect and induced 
effects to the rise in employment rates by industry 
and country
Effects of the investment in care or construction can also be 
analysed with respect to output and GDP growth. Figure 3 
shows the effect on output (GDP) of the same investment 
equal to 2% of GDP in each of those two industries. In this 
case the direct effect is just that initial 2% from the initial 
injection in the economy. Indirect and induced output ef-
fects vary between countries: in Australia and Japan, total 
effects are larger for investment in the construction than in 
the care industry, but it is the other way around in the UK 
and the US, while no major difference overall is observed 
in Italy, Germany and Denmark. In Australia, Japan and the 
US, GDP is boosted by about 7%, i.e., 5 percentage points 
above the initial injection, reflecting an output multiplier, 
that is the ratio of total to direct effects, of around 3.5-4 for 
both industries. Effects are smallest in Denmark.
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Figure 3 Contribution of direct, indirect and induced 
effects to GDP growth
It is the labour intensity of the care industry that causes 
larger employment effects of investment in it not to re-
sult in larger output effects than for construction industry 
(in Australia, Italy and Japan at least). This would change 
if care was more valued and its workers better paid, but 
then the employment effects would be smaller too. The 
case for care as a more effective form of stimulus than 
construction does not hold consistently across countries 
if we are looking at effects in terms of GDP. Either form of 
investment provides a stimulus that generates good re-
turns in terms of both employment and output. In choos-
ing the mix of investment, probably the most important 
consideration are the benefits of the investment itself, 
though it remains that case that investment in care always 
does more for gender equality. 
Additional simulations for long-term 
projections
Using a different simulation tool, the Cambridge Alpha-
metrics Model (CAM), we have also projected what would 
be the result on employment in the medium-to-long-term 
from different investment scenarios, similar in focus to 
those explored above, but with slightly different assump-
tions and parameters. CAM is a demand-driven global 
macroeconomic model that can be used for medium-to-
long-term projections of historical trends of the global 
economy, major blocs of countries and major countries 
(Cripps and Kurasee, 2010).
In this analysis, the model is used to project employment 
and GDP effects of different policy scenarios into the year 
2030. Three scenarios are considered: (1) a business as 
usual scenario in which current economic policies con-
tinue into the foreseeable future, including fiscal consoli-
dation and modest investment plans within budget con-
straints; (2) an overall investment boost with increases 
in private and public investment and spending over and 
above the business-as-usual scenario, but not targeted at 
any particular industry; (3) a gendered investment boost 
in which scenario (2) is applied but investment is mar-
shalled in such a way that it prioritises increasing female 
employment, implicitly by targeting a larger increase in fe-
male employment rates than in overall employment rates. 
The model is applied to different sets of countries or blocs 
of countries that reflect the choice of OECD countries in 
our main analysis. Not all countries are identifiable indi-
vidually in CAM. Italy is included in the bloc “Eurozone pe-
riphery” alongside Spain, Greece and Portugal; Australia 
is grouped with Canada and New Zealand and Japan 
features with South Korea in a block of high income East 
Asian countries. Denmark cannot be easily analysed, as 
Scandinavian countries are grouped together with coun-
tries in Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Czech Re-
public, which makes results for them difficult to interpret. 
Therefore we have dropped Denmark and its bloc from 
this analysis.
As the model runs on a different set of economic rela-
tions14, the results are not directly comparable with the 
input-output analysis above. However, qualitative com-
parisons can be made, especially between the overall 
investment scenario and the gendered investment sce-
nario.
The business - as - usual benchmark scenario includes 
current plans that differ across the countries/blocs stud-
ied. For example, the business as usual scenario for the 
EU countries factors in the EUR 315bn Juncker Investment 
Plan, so it is not strictly speaking a pure austerity plan, 
although it assumes fiscal consolidation of current gov-
ernment spending in the short term. Table 16 shows the 
bloc-specific assumptions of the boost scenarios (overall 
and gendered) for private investment and government 
spending, over and above those made for the business 
as usual benchmark. As the model sets a medium-term 
target, these figures are not to be understood as exog-
enous shocks in demand for the economy (as in the analy-
sis above) but as the results of both an initial investment 
boost carried through year on year and the knock-on ef-
fects on growth and thus government spending and pri-
vate investment further down the line. Hence in 2030, the 
total share of private investment and government spend-
ing as a percentage of GDP is higher than 2% compared 
to the business as usual scenario, reflecting cumulative 
effects over the years.15
14 Unlike general equilibrium models, as an open disequilibrium system CAM does not assume any 
single equilibrium path to which the world economy tends to return in the medium or long-term (un-
like input-output models implicitly); this means that it can simulate a wide variety of outcomes with 
different growth rates and end points (Cripps, 2014). In CAM the world economy is modelled as an 
integrated system in which social and economic variables of different countries and blocs differ. Time-
series data taken from the United Nations Statistics Division and the IMF are incorporated in the model 
and regularly updated (currently 1970-2015).
15 CAM does not work with initial shocks to be put in the model but rather by setting targets to reach 
(for investment and government spending for example) so there is no distinction between exogenous 
spending (our 2% GDP carried through year on year) and endogenous spending.
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Table 16 Private investment and government spending in 2030 – boost scenarios relative to business as 
usual
 
 
Target 2030 (% GDP)
Private investment Government spending
Germany 2.92 1.00
UK 2.94 2.00
Eurozone Periphery 2.93 2.48
US 3.68 0.95
Australia / Can. 0.67 0.54
East Asia  
High Income 0.11 -0.62
Source: calculations by Giovanni Cozzi using CAM (2015)
Table 17 shows the results of the different boost scenarios on employment rates. These figures are in line with the 
input-output analysis above, as the gendered investment scenario seems to produce better results in terms of total 
employment rates and reduction of gender employment gaps than the ‘overall’ investment scenario. Note however 
that increases in employment observed in 2030 are much smaller than those in the input-output analysis because the 
CAM model has a supply side that might constraint the effective increased demand for labour. By contrast, the input-
output model only provides labour demand estimates, and thus implicitly assumes that any job created will be taken 
by someone available and with the right set of skills (see Appendix 2).
Albeit with variation between countries that reflects their labour market structure and economic policy priorities, the 
gendered investment boost scenario shows a total employment effect that is greater than the overall boost scenario 
(up to twice as large in the Eurozone periphery). Interestingly, not only women’s employment rates are raised sub-
stantially more in the gendered boost scenario than in the overall boost scenario, but also men’s employment rates 
increase in all blocs to the same extent than in the overall boost scenario. 
Photo: ILO
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Total Women Men
Overall Gendered Overall Gendered Overall Gendered
Germany 0.47 0.73 0.21 0.74 0.73 0.72
UK 0.65 0.91 0.31 0.82 1.01 1.02
Eurozone Periphery 0.95 1.94 0.84 2.93 1.04 0.94
US 0.37 0.69 -0.11 0.53 0.86 0.86
Australia / Can. 0.39 0.76 -0.02 0.73 0.81 0.81
East Asia High Income 0.31 0.32 0.11 0.13 0.5 0.51
Source: calculations by Giovanni Cozzi using CAM (2015)
The CAM model also provides estimates of economic growth and public debt over the long term. Table 18 compares 
the figures for 2015 and 2030 for the business as usual scenario with the investment scenarios. The first two columns 
show the cumulative effects of GDP in 2030 for the two investment scenarios over and above the effect of the busi-
ness as usual scenario. For example, the gendered investment scenario in Germany leads to a GDP figure that is 32% 
higher at the end of the 2015-2030 period than that obtained by a business as usual scenario. Both investment boost 
scenarios yield similar positive results in all blocs as expected with variations between countries ranging from a 26% 
boost in the UK to a 56% boost in the US. Differences in cumulative growth between the boost scenarios are only no-
ticeable in the Eurozone periphery where the gendered scenario increases GDP by 5 percentage points more than the 
overall boost scenario. Government Debt is reduced more as a percentage of GDP by 2030 in the case of the boost 
scenario (similar figures for both scenarios) than in the case of the business - as - usual scenario. In other words, the 
investments that characterise the two boost scenarios more than pay for themselves, even using the narrow criterion 
of their effect on the public finances.
 
 
GDP growth (% cumul.) Debt (% GDP)
Overall Gendered 2015 Usual 2030 Boost 2030
Germany 31.76 32.37 71.6 66.6 57.7
UK 26.13 26.19 78.6 75.9 59.0
Eurozone Periphery 27.76 32.68 120.1 105.3 83.4
US 56.01 55.94 93.4 93.2 70.1
Australia / Can. 34.72 34.78 66.9 73.2 56.3
East Asia High Income 29.20 29.50 46.3 43.6 35.4
Source: calculations by Giovanni Cozzi using CAM (2015)
Results from this independent set of simulations confirm the hypotheses outlined above that investing in the economy 
produces positive results when it comes to economic growth and government debt even if it initially requires addi-
tional government spending, ruling out any claim that austerity policies of cutting government spending offer both 
employment and GDP growth as well as fiscal discipline. Moreover, gendered investment strategies increase total 
employment more and men’s employment in equal measure than non-gendered strategies but at the same time are 
more effective in reducing gender employment gaps. 
Table 18 Cumulative effects on GDP and government debt (2015-2030)
Table 17 Percentage point increase in employment rates in two investment scenarios (2030)
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Conclusion
This report has shown that policies that are effective in 
promoting economic growth and employment are likely to 
be those that include public investment in infrastructure 
rather than austerity and public spending cuts. However, 
it is necessary to see infrastructure from a broader point 
of view than usually portrayed in accounts of Keynesian 
intervention plans. Social infrastructure, the activities that 
provide health care, education, childcare and adult long-
term care are vital to maintaining and growing the produc-
tive capacity of an economy, as well as being essential 
ways of developing people’s quality of life.
In the short-term, our simulations have shown that invest-
ing the equivalent of 2% of GDP either in the care industry 
or in the construction industry generates substantial posi-
tive employment and output effects. However investing in 
care produces larger employment effects in all countries. 
Not only are more jobs created through direct, indirect 
and induced effects than by investment in the construc-
tion industry, but because more of the jobs that are gener-
ated are likely to be taken up by women, such investment 
helps reduce gender inequalities in employment. We also 
argue that working conditions would be improved along 
the way as more jobs become available in care services.
We observe differences in magnitude between countries 
that are due in part to differences in the structure of la-
bour markets (level of compensation of care workers) and 
the organisation of the industry (outsourcing and labour 
intensity depending on the mix between residential or 
centre-based care and family or at-home care). Even in 
countries where average compensation of employees in 
the care industry is close to that of the construction indus-
try (i.e., all countries but the UK and the US), employment 
effects are larger owing to fewer imports and greater la-
bour intensity in care services.
Although it is likely that in the long-run some of the ini-
tial investment will be recouped through improvements 
in productivity, the permanent nature of the services in 
care (paying carers’ wages every year) will likely require 
a different funding model than one-off projects such as 
building roads or houses. However, some of the large 
physical infrastructure projects tend to have long spans 
before the product is finished and may require perma-
nent streams of funding too. Taxation should therefore be 
a key instrument in the design and the implementation 
of such policies altogether. For care services as well as 
environmentally-friendly infrastructure, this could take the 
form of a social contract between generations using gen-
eral taxation.
Additional analysis using the CAM model has confirmed 
that economic policies that aim at increasing private in-
vestment and public spending are beneficial in the long 
term, for employment, economic growth and government 
debt reduction. Moreover investment policies that target 
female employment in particular, such as investment in 
care industries, have slightly better results on overall em-
ployment, and on reducing gender gaps than more gen-
der-neutral strategies while increasing male employment 
in equal measure.
Expanding on this research, it would be useful to refine 
the assumptions for calculating induced effects, as more 
detailed social accounting matrices can do, or using a 
full-blown microsimulation model to estimate consump-
tion and employment behaviours in reaction of the initial 
investment. Also, rather than comparing similar sizes of in-
vestment between countries (in our case, 2% of GDP), fur-
ther investigation could include a more accurate picture 
of the unmet care needs in different countries for which 
funding and investment is required, as some countries 
may be much further away from providing adequately for 
their population’s care needs than other (see Italy versus 
Denmark for example).
In the end, the argument must be that investing in a car-
ing economy reaches beyond economic and employment 
benefits, as does investing in sustainable and environ-
mentally-friendly physical infrastructure. Providing high 
quality care that people need is a sign of a civilised and 
healthy society and that in itself is a sufficient condition 
to advocate for public investment in high quality care ser-
vices. Moreover, both investing in care services and in 
construction projects satisfying renewable and environ-
mentally-friendly criteria are vital steps in enabling socie-
ties to become sustainable. The two types of investment 
should be considered together. This report suggests that 
the urgent need to solve the care crisis and address gen-
der inequalities makes investment in the social infrastruc-
ture a higher priority than is currently the case. Be that as 
it may, the results of this analysis and other studies show 
that, as an effective alternative to austerity, investment in 
physical infrastructure cannot be presented as the only 
form of investment that would stimulate employment and 
economic activity.
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Australia
System of care provision (care regime)
Australia, an Antipodean “liberal” welfare regime (Esp-
ing-Andersen, 1990; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011), 
has scant provision of public services, and all benefits 
are means-tested. However, its social protection system 
is more comprehensive and inclusive than that of other 
liberal welfare states (Castles, 1998; Arts and Gelissen, 
2002). Because thresholds are relatively high a consider-
able part of the population receives some means-tested 
benefits. Income guarantees, employment security and 
wage controls play a more important role in the state’s 
redistributive efforts than social services.
Long-term care 
The federal government is responsible for designing and 
financing long-term care (LTC) provision for the popula-
tion over 65 years old (usually referred to as ‘aged care’ in 
Australia), and states and territories for planning and mon-
itoring services for those with care needs who are under 
65, under the terms of the National Disability Agreement 
(OECD 2011a). It is estimated that 2.3% of the total popula-
tion use LTC services (1.6 at home and 0.7 in institutions 
(OECD 2008)). Nearly all publicly funded provision is de-
livered by the private sector, often by non-profit organisa-
tions. All programmes are tax-funded, but some require 
co-payments. 
Several schemes have been designed to meet the re-
quirements of those with care needs. First, public funding 
for residential care is means-tested and co-payments by 
recipients account for approximately 30% of funding. Eli-
gibility is assessed by the Aged Care Assessment Teams 
(ACATs) and the average subsidy per person in 2009 
amounted to AUD 20,000 for those with low care needs 
and AUD 52,000 for those with high care needs (OECD 
2011a). In comparison – the mean disposable household 
income in 2009-2010 was AUD 44,096 (USD 30,836) an-
nually (ABS, 2013). 
Second, non-residential care (Home and Community 
Care (HACC)) is a programme funded (just under 60%) 
by the federal government and (just under 40%) by state, 
territorial or local governments, with co-payments provid-
ing up to 5% of funding. This programme includes com-
munity nursing, community-based respite care, domestic 
assistance and personal care, as well as transport and 
meals. Additional alternative packages are available un-
der HACC: Community Aged Care Packages (CACPs), 
also available to those approved by ACATs, and subject to 
means testing are an alternative to low - level residential 
care and consist of home-care services for elderly peo-
ple (approximately 5-6 hours of direct assistance weekly). 
The average subsidy in 2009 was AUD 12,000 per person 
and 10% was financed from co-payments. The alternative 
to for those with high care needs is Extended Aged Care 
at Home (EACH) funded federally. The assistance offered 
goes beyond CACPs and the subsidy per person amount-
ed to AUD 39,000 in 2009. Finally, special help is offered 
to people with dementia (Extended Aged Care at Home 
Dementia (EACHD)). It is similar to EACH but provides 
specialised services. The direct assistance of 15-20 hours 
per week attracts a higher subsidy per person annually. 
Irrespective of the package granted, the federal govern-
ment sets the maximum daily payment the service provid-
ers can be remunerated. If the individual’s expenses ex-
ceed the annual threshold the beneficiary qualifies for a 
20% tax offset (OECD, 2011a). Overall, government spend-
ing on all programmes aimed at providing long-term care 
services for elderly people amounted to 0.85% of GDP in 
2011-12 of which 70% was for residential care (SGRGSP, 
2013).
Any care provider needs to meet quality standards super-
vised and monitored by the Aged Care Standards and Ac-
creditation Agency, which has a formal complaints inves-
tigation scheme. In 2007 almost 2% of Australia’s labour 
force worked in the residential and non-residential care 
sectors, but the majority of LTC services (over 83% in 2003) 
are still provided informally by family, partners or other per-
sonal carers, some of whom receive cash allowances from 
the government. Faced with rising demand for LTC work-
ers – up to 140% by 2050 (OECD, 2011a) – Australia has 
introduced immigration programmes for long-term care 
workers and measures related to skill upgrading, including 
public funding streams for care workers interested in quali-
fying for the nursing profession.
Childcare and early education
The Australian pro-market orientation is also visible in 
its funding of for-profit childcare. Eligible parents of pre-
school children can choose between day care centres 
or family day care to receive a means-tested childcare 
benefit (CCB). There is also a non means-tested childcare 
rebate that reduces by 50% the out of pocket expenses 
(after any CCB) up to a ceiling. Budget 2015 recently re-
formed the funding system by offering, from 2017, a sin-
gle means-tested payment called childcare subsidy (paid 
to the provider) of up to 85% of childcare costs for low 
income families and 50% for middle income families 
(Families Package 2015). Eligible parents must be in work, 
looking for employment, training or volunteering for a 
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specified minimum number of hours per week. Additional 
assistance is provided to those with children with greater 
needs and/or in disadvantaged communities. As a result 
of generous means-testing (and the non-means tested 
element) the subsidy provided is larger than 50% of the 
fee, for 95% of children in care. In 2013, about a third of 
children aged 0-2 were enrolled in formal childcare, com-
pared to two thirds of those aged 3 to 5 (OECD Family 
database, 2014). In Australia primary education starts at 
5 years old.
Funding is a shared responsibility between federal, state 
and local governments with the federal government con-
tributing 81% of the total. ECEC fee subsidies (including 
for after-school care) is estimated to amount to about 
AUD 9bn in 2011. This figure, which includes the cost of 
primary education funding for 5 - year - olds, represents 
0.59% of GDP (OECD SOCX, 2015).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Denmark
System of care provision (care regime)
Denmark, as a Nordic “social-democratic” welfare state 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999), offers extensive social rights 
and marginalises the role of private formal welfare provi-
sion. The universal rights approach emphasises equality 
of all citizens, thus provision of a high level of basic secu-
rity is a central concern. The combined use of in-kind and 
cash benefits together offer employment and care ser-
vices allowing both women and men to participate fully in 
the labour market (Myles, 1998: 344).
Long-term care 
Long-term care (LTC) services are provided and financed 
by local councils (under the Consolidation Act on Social 
Services (CASS)). Access is equal and free of charge for 
all legal residents of Denmark irrespective of age, wealth 
or income. Services are financed through local taxes and 
block grants from the state (Schulz 2010). Available ser-
vices comprise conventional nursing homes (rent is paid 
according to a person’s income), subsidised housing for 
older people with care facilities and care workers, and 
care at the recipient’s home (temporary care has to be 
paid by the recipient, permanent care is free of charge). 
The government has explicitly given priority to commu-
nity care and help for elderly people in their homes over 
residential care, through offering personal care services 
and domestic help – shopping, cleaning etc. The aim of 
providing formal help to all people with critical needs is 
achieved as it is estimated that almost everyone who has 
severe impairment receives some formal care, with the re-
mainder either able to cope without help or receiving help 
from relatives or friends. Among those aged 65+, 94% of 
the 125,000 individuals who were identified as having se-
vere impairments received formal help in 2010, according 
to the SHARE survey (Schulz, 2014).
In 2003, following the ‘free choice reform’, private care 
providers entered the sector. Thus, individuals and pri-
vate companies that meet quality standards and munici-
pality price requirements can receive from users a service 
certificate which allows the municipality to employ them. 
However, their numbers are still limited and they over-
whelmingly provide practical help with instrumental daily 
activities such as housework and shopping (Schulz, 2014). 
Local authorities can also grant cash benefits to those with 
care needs (OECD, 2011a). Together the in-kind and the 
cash benefits for LTC in Denmark amounted to 4.5% of 
GDP in 2010 (2.5% on services and 2% on cash transfers), 
the highest in the OECD (Lipszyc et al., 2012: 11).
Although, as in every other country, the majority of care is 
still provided unpaid by family, because LTC services are 
to a large extent institutionalised, publicly funded, availa-
ble and guaranteed, Denmark has one of the lowest rates 
of informal caregiving in Europe. Informal carers are nev-
ertheless well supported and can claim a care allowance 
as compensation for lost wages (OECD, 2011a). 
Childcare and early education
This “social-democratic” universalist approach also ap-
plies to child care. Denmark has one of the highest pro-
portions of children in state-subsidised child care institu-
tions in Europe. As Wolfe (1989) has argued, the family 
“goes public” in Denmark and most Danish children spend 
part of their lives in day care. This universal child care pro-
vision was introduced when an alliance of the women’s 
movement with other powerful organisations (e.g., social 
pedagogues) advocating the ideal of professional care 
managed to break through a previously prevailing rheto-
ric of opposition between children’s and women’s  inter-
ests (Kremer, 2006).
The thriving development of centre-based child care in 
Denmark in the 1960s also helped meet the demand for 
greater employment in a way that corresponded with the 
emancipatory views of Danish women aspiring to financial 
independence from their male partners. Instead of relying 
on immigration, as most Western European countries did 
to increase their labour force, Denmark employed women 
already in the country to fill the gaps (Borchorst and Siim, 
1987).
Today Denmark has the best-trained child care workers 
in Europe (Siim, 2000; Borchorst, 2002). It argues that 
professional care for younger children gives them the ‘so-
cial pedagogical’ attention not available at home and ‘fo-
cuses not only on individual development but also on be-
coming a social human being’ (Kremer 2006: 266). Child 
care provision is the responsibility of municipalities, and 
all children from the age of 26 weeks up until 6 years are 
entitled to a full-time place in a day care. 91% of children 
aged 1-2 years (74% of 0-2) and 97% of children aged 3-5 
were enrolled in day care in Denmark in 2011 (EC, 2014). 
Parental payments are earnings-related but capped at 
25% of operating costs (EU, 2015). In total Danish pub-
lic expenditure on childcare and early education services 
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amounts to almost 1.5% of GDP and is the highest of all 
the OECD countries (OECD SOCX, 2015).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Germany
System of care provision (care regime)9
Germany is described as  having a ‘continental-corpo-
ratist’ welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferragina 
and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011) which means that it diversifies 
sources of care, relying on different actors and assign-
ing a greater role to the market and occupational group-
based social insurance (Degavre and Nyssens, 2012: 23). 
Long-term care 
In 1995 Germany pioneered a new system of funding 
long-term care by introducing a system of compulsory 
long-term care insurance (LTCI) for those below a certain 
household income level, expanding the universal long-
term care (LTC) risk coverage and developing benefit 
provisions beyond just means-tested public assistance 
(OECD, 2011a). After assessment of needs by the Medical 
Review Board (MDK), insured beneficiaries can choose 
between cash or in-kind benefits or a combination of 
both. Despite the fact that the value of the cash payments 
is about half that of in-kind services, the majority of us-
ers opt to receive only cash, or a combination of services 
and money, to compensate family members for their infor-
mal care. In-kind care services are almost entirely (97%) 
provided by private companies and non-governmental 
organisations, contracted by Long-Term Care Insurance 
Funds. Likewise, semi-residential care home providers 
(day care centres and respite care facilities) are private 
or run by non-profit organisations (over half of all homes) 
(OECD, 2011a).
Taken together the in-kind and the cash benefits for LTC 
in Germany amounted to 1.43% of GDP in 2010 (Lipszyc 
et al., 2012: 11). Eligibility for LTC benefits is based on LTCI 
contributions from employees and employers for at least 
2 years within a period of 10 years prior to application. 
Approximately 90% of the adult working population is 
covered. 
However, insurance very often does not entirely cover the 
suggested care package, in which cases either means-
tested transfers are provided through social assistance 
schemes, or the recipients and their family are respon-
sible for paying for the remainder (OECD, 2011a). In ad-
dition, the package suggested by insurance funds is fo-
cused on para-medical care, rather than on home help 
which tends to be poorly covered.  As in other countries, 
such as Italy and Spain, beneficiaries of cash allowances 
often employ home care workers operating in the grey 
economy. To regularise that situation the government in 
2009 introduced financial incentives for standard secure 
employment, such as tax deductions of 20% of care costs 
up to EUR 4,000 a year. Some tax deductions are offered 
also for employment with a lower standard of security (so 
called “mini-jobs”), and for employment of immigrants on 
a 24-hour basis for no longer than three months (Degavre 
and Nyssens, 2012: 40).
Additionally, private insurance for supplementary LTC 
coverage is available in the market, and it is estimated 
that 1.58 million people have specific insurance for the re-
maining LTC costs, insurance that pays a set additional 
amount for LTC irrespective of actual cost, or use life in-
surance (OECD, 2011a).
Childcare & early education
German childcare provision has up until recently reflected 
the conservative welfare state tradition, putting respon-
sibility for childcare primarily within the family and con-
sidering the role of formal care as supplementary. In that 
sense this ‘residual’ familialistic model for childcare dif-
fers from the model for long-term care that has evolved 
towards a social insurance system. However, following 
the Barcelona Summit in 2002, where the European Un-
ion set a target for 2010 of 33% of formal care coverage 
for children aged 0-3, and 90% for 3-6 years, public child-
care provision was expanded dramatically with massive 
direct investment by the federal government in new day 
care places, especially for under two-year-olds (Goerres 
and Tepe, 2012). As a result 24% of children aged 0-2 
were enrolled in formal day care in 2011, up from 10% ten 
years earlier (OECD Family database, 2014). The govern-
ment’s main rationale was that better public availability of 
childcare would increase female employment and fertil-
ity rates. Since 1 August 2013, every child between the 
ages of one to school entry age has the legal right to early 
childhood support in a day care centre or day nursery, 
and the public subsidy covers about 80% of the cost of 
a slot. However the 2013 target of reaching 35% cover-
age was not attained and average coverage remained 10 
points below target, with substantial regional variation. 
Recent empirical evidence showed that fertility rates in-
creased in the counties of West Germany that saw a large 
increase in childcare coverage (Bauernschuster et al., 
2014). Parents can also claim back some of their child-
care expenses through a form of tax relief, available to all. 
And since 2013, cash for childcare was introduced with a 
low monthly allowance to parents looking after a child at 
home for up to 36 months (EC, 2014). In total German pub-
lic expenditure on childcare and early education services 
amounted to 0.5% of GDP in 2011 (OECD SOCX, 2015).
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Italy
System of care provision (care regime)
Italy, which is portrayed as a “familialistic” welfare state 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 
2011), relies mostly on family care and financial transfers 
for care services. With formal home care services rela-
tively underdeveloped, the majority of support is provid-
ed through cash allowances. 
Long-term care 
The main form of social assistance for long-term care 
(LTC) is through a national disability cash benefit (called 
Attendance Allowance) that is paid by the National Social 
Security Institute to all citizens assessed as being una-
ble to perform the basic activities of daily life16. This pay-
ment is monthly, universal, not restricted by age, and not 
linked to a means test or to social security contributions. 
No plan for purchasing LTC services is required to receive 
the benefit and recipients are free to spend the money 
as they want (OECD, 2011a). However, formal in-kind pro-
vision of care at home is almost non-existent (and that 
which does consists of mainly residential nursing care). 
With changing family structure and growing mobility, fam-
ilies increasingly struggled to provide adequate informal 
care to relatives. As a result, Italy saw an increase in low 
paid care provided by immigrants (both legal and illegal, 
and often irregular), a phenomenon that became known 
as the “migrant in the family” (Knijn and Saraceno, 2009). 
One estimate puts the proportion of care workers who are 
foreign-born (circa 2010) at 72% (OECD, 2011a). The Italian 
government made an attempt to regulate this grey econ-
omy by introducing in 2005 a tax benefit for employers 
(19% of the care-provider salary, but only up to EUR 399 
per year) and tax deduction of their social security contri-
butions (of between EUR 356 and EUR 666 per year). The 
benefits are limited to families that pay taxes whose joint 
income does not exceed EUR 40,000 per year (Degavre 
and Nyssens, 2012). 
A second allowance, the Care Allowance, is financed by 
the regions and municipalities and takes the form of a cash 
payment or a voucher for purchasing home care services. 
It was introduced in 2000 and resulted in the creation of 
individual care plans for all care recipients. However, due 
to poor needs assessment processes and dysfunctional 
execution and monitoring of care plans, the effectiveness 
of the allowance is being disputed (Degavre and Nyssens, 
2012). Nevertheless, this programme has resulted in the 
government focusing on the use of ‘conditional monetary 
subsidies’ tied to the use of a service. 
Together public funding of in-kind LTC provision and cash 
benefits amounted to 1.9% of GDP in 2010 (Lipszyc et al., 
2012: 11).
16 Needs are assessed by Local Health Authorities (ASL) and the National Health Service (SSN) work-
ing in multidisciplinary teams. The classification system differs across regions, thus the number of 
beneficiaries varies. The final decision on granting an allowance is taken by the National Institute of 
Social Security (INPS) (OECD 2011a).
Childcare and early education
The Italian ‘familialistic’ type of welfare state also mani-
fests itself in child care, mainly provided informally within 
the family. This is common practice, especially for very 
small children, when a grandmother is in good health and 
lives nearby. Enrolment in formal childcare for children un-
der 3 has traditionally been very low – albeit with large 
regional variations (Del Boca et al., 2005). From 2007 the 
government focused on greatly increasing funding for for-
mal childcare to comply with the 2002 Barcelona summit 
recommendations. By 2011, about 26% of 0-2 year olds 
were enrolled in day care facilities (EC, 2014). Enrolment 
for older children aged 3 to 5 has always been much high-
er, close to 100%, as part of the free pre-primary school 
system (Scuola materna) (EC, 2014). Existing public child 
care is well-subsidised and has high quality standards, 
similar to most Northern European countries. It is highly 
regulated in terms of opening hours and duration (limited 
to 7-7.5 hours a day), especially for the care of children 
under 3. In total Italian public expenditure on childcare 
and early education services amounted to 0.6% of GDP in 
2011 (OECD SOCX, 2015). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Japan
System of care provision (care regime)
Japan, as an East-Asian ‘conservative’ welfare regime (Es-
ping-Andersen, 1990; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011; 
Miyamoto, 2003), is characterised by limited social ex-
penditure and relies on the family and local community as 
primary care providers. It also incorporates elements of a 
‘liberal’ welfare state that gives priority to market mecha-
nisms (Esping-Andersen, 1999).
Long-term care 
Japan’s long-term care provision faces increasing chal-
lenges, with a rapidly ageing population. It already has 
the highest share of the population aged over 80 among 
OECD countries, with demand for LTC services projected 
to double by 2050, while the potential workforce is ex-
pected to decline (OECD, 2011a). To tackle the changes, 
the government introduced in 2000 a Long-Term Care In-
surance (LTCI) programme in addition to the compulsory 
national health care system. It was designed to support 
beneficiaries’ independence and relieve the family of 
care duties. This system enabled for-profit entities to be 
subsidised to provide home care services in addition to 
existing non-profit ones. Residential care remained main-
ly non-profit. 
In spite of the above changes, LTC expenditure in Japan 
remains below that of the Nordic countries systems – it 
spent 0.91% of its GDP on long-term nursing care services 
in 2011 (0.78% on public care and 0.13% on private care) 
(OECD SOCX, 2015). All LTC services are financed either 
by taxes collected from various levels of government 
(45% of the total), by social contributions – paid by those 
40|56 Investing in the Care Economy
over 40 based on their incomes (45%) or by direct pay-
ment from the beneficiaries (10%) (OECD, 2011a). 
Long-term care (LTC) services are available to all citizens 
over 65 and to people aged between 40 and 64 for illness-
es such as Parkinson’s, pre-senile dementia or stroke. Lo-
cal government assesses a person’s care needs and pro-
vides a personal LTC plan designed and organised by a 
“care manager”. LTC insurance covers 90% of the cost of 
the services regardless of the type of provider (institution, 
community-based or at home) as long as they are certified 
(OECD, 2011a). To become a certified LTC worker a person 
has to obtain minimum training qualifications, depending 
on the service provided. Formal caregivers are protected 
under the Labour Standards Act, and are therefore enti-
tled to benefits such as annual paid leave, maternity leave 
or child care leave, and workers’ accident compensation. 
Additionally, they are offered training, counselling and 
post-care employment assistance by municipalities.
Childcare and early education
Japan has one of the lowest fertility rates (1.37 in 2009) 
in the world. To change this situation the government has 
made some efforts over the last decade to ‘defamilialise’ 
childcare and has introduced pro-natalist policy reforms 
(Soma and Yamashita, 2011). 
Japan provides two types of formal care - kindergartens 
(school-based and usually for 3-5 year olds) and child day 
care facilities (welfare based and for children aged 0-5). 
In total, 9 out of 10 children aged 3 to 5 were enrolled 
in childcare facilities (Soma and Yamashita, 2011). Kinder-
gartens attracted 56% of children enrolled in formal child-
care in 2008, 80% of whom were in privately-run facilities 
(NIER, 2011). Day care centres can be licensed and op-
erated by public or private sector organisations, or non-
licensed and operated at home. They offer care also for 
children under 3 years old (26% enrolment rate in 2011). 
54% of children aged 0-5 enrolled in day-care centres at-
tended private facilities in 2008 (NIER, 2011). In 2000, the 
government introduced the Social Welfare Law that de-
regulated child care and allowed private sector child care 
facilities to grow. Some local governments cut their care 
budgets or privatised their day care centres in an attempt 
to bridge their fiscal deficits. This change was described 
as the withdrawal of the public sector from the primary 
provision of welfare services and a reduction in quality 
of care. Since then centres not previously approved as 
care providers by the authorities, as well as non-profit or-
ganisations, have become a viable alternative. This turn 
“from state to market” locates Japan closer to the ‘liber-
al’ welfare regimes. By 2011, total public expenditure on 
childcare and early education services was 0.13% of GDP, 
the lowest in the OECD countries studied (OECD SOCX, 
2015).
United Kingdom
System of care provision (care regime)
The United Kingdom is defined as a ‘liberal’ welfare state 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 
2011) and, according to this typology, acknowledges mar-
ket dominance and does not engage significantly in pub-
lic social and welfare provision, instead providing for basic 
needs on a means-tested basis. The UK is often classified 
as a liberal welfare state with a medium level of social 
stratification of provision, mainly because of its National 
Health Service (NHS), which provides in-kind transfers 
that are free at the point of use (Arts and Gelissen, 2002: 
146). The administration and part of the funding of long 
term care and childcare services are devolved to the four 
nations of the UK, with slightly different levels of public 
funding, especially in Scotland. 
Long-term care 
The United Kingdom has introduced major reforms to 
long-term care (LTC) over the last 20 years in order to 
contain the costs of meeting the changing and increas-
ing needs of its population. Since 1993, when major re-
forms to the social care system were carried out in Eng-
land, dependent older people have been supported by 
means-tested locally run social care services and disabil-
ity-related centrally administered social security benefits 
(Degavre and Nyssens, 2012: 34). The main role of local 
authorities has been to assess the needs of individuals, 
commission services and oversee the work of the local 
care quasi-markets (Malley et al., 2010). These markets 
are highly competitive (thus, there is a risk that price com-
petition results in multiple providers engaging in a race 
‘to the bottom’ in terms of quality through reducing re-
muneration for care workers) and at the same time highly 
regulated, standardised and supervised by national bod-
ies (e.g., the Care Quality Commission). 
There is a definite trend towards a ‘personalisation agen-
da’ to be delivered through a consumer-directed care 
model (Fernández et al., 2007) of means-tested cash ben-
efits to purchase social and personal care services (Direct 
Payments introduced in 1997). Currently these are in addi-
tion to the remaining in-kind care services (mainly health-
related nursing interventions), but further encroachment 
of Direct Payments into the Health Service is planned. 
Personal Budgets are becoming universal, but those who 
do not want to manage their own budgets can hand over 
the management of their budget to a third party (family, 
friends or the local authority). These payments have in-
creased the shift away from formal, regulated professional 
care service provision towards unregulated informal car-
ers, paid or unpaid, who despite emotional commitment, 
may lack necessary expertise (Lewis and Hobson, 1997; 
Pavolini and Ranci, 2008; Rostgaard, 2011). 
In Scotland, social care is provided free of charge for all 
those aged 65 or more who need it (over and above exist-
ing cash benefits). Care in residential facilities is also free 
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but recipients have to pay for their accommodation cost 
(with means-tested support for low income people).
There is also income support available in all the UK na-
tions for those in need of long-term care or their carers. 
Attendance Allowance (for those above 65) or Personal 
Independence Payment (for those aged 16-64, with in-
creasingly strict eligibility conditions for those who can 
prove they are not fit for employment) are both flat-rate 
universal benefits. Severe Disability Premium, a top-up 
to the means-tested Pension Credit is also available for 
the severely disabled, as is the Carer’s Allowance, for 
those who care full-time for a relative. Except for in Scot-
land, these allowances reflect the emphasis on direct 
cash transfers to pay for private care of the beneficiary’s 
choice rather than subsidising the direct provision of ser-
vices (Degavre and Nyssens, 2012: 35). For the UK as a 
whole, public in-kind LTC services amounted to 1.42% of 
GDP and cash benefits to 0.56% of GDP in 2010 (Lipszyc 
et al., 2012: 11).
Childcare and early education
In keeping with its liberal tradition, the UK has promoted 
private provision of childcare, either by the family or the 
market (for or not for profit). However, successive govern-
ments have increased the financial support available for 
parents of pre-school children over the last 15 years with 
the introduction in 2003 of childcare tax credits for fami-
lies on low income and entitlement to some free childcare 
for 3 and 4-year-olds (later expanded to 15h per week and 
also to disadvantaged 2 year olds, with recent plans to in-
crease hours to 30). Despite this, provision remains below 
demand and costs have been rising constantly with no 
sign of abating as increasing eligibility for subsidies fu-
els demand. This has led to price rises without attracting 
more provision because the level at which subsidies are 
paid has not risen in line with actual running costs. Use is 
also very unequal according to income with lower to mid-
dle income families reporting least access to affordable 
childcare (Van Lancker, 2013). Despite rising enrolment of 
young children in formal childcare, most attend day care 
facilities part-time, reflected in the high level of mothers’ 
part-time employment. In 2011, about 35% of children un-
der 3 attended formal childcare, but for an average of only 
14 hours per week. The same holds for older children: al-
though 90% of 3-5 year olds were formally enrolled, the 
average number of hours in childcare and pre-primary 
education was 20 per week (EC, 2014).
Families pay directly to the care provider. A recent reform 
is introducing a “tax-free” childcare scheme to replace the 
existing employer-based childcare voucher. The scheme 
to be rolled in from 2017 will pay for 20% of the cost of 
childcare, up to an annual limit per child, and will be avail-
able to employed parents who are not receiving tax cred-
its.
In total the UK’s public expenditure on childcare and early 
education services is around 0.4% of GDP, in the form of 
the three main subsidies available (childcare tax credit, 
voucher/tax-free childcare, and free entitlement to pre-
school education), and hasn’t changed much since 2010 
(EC, 2014; Emmerson et al., 2015). However, since chil-
dren enter primary education when 5 years old, total pub-
lic spending on ECEC includes their first year, and was 
estimated to be 0.8% of GDP in 2011 (OECD SOCX, 2015).
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United States
System of care provision (care regime)
The US has a ‘liberal’ welfare system (Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011). Since the 1970s 
this has been called a ‘workfare’ system, where social in-
surance benefits are modest and means-tested, and citi-
zens are urged to provide for their own welfare in the mar-
ket, by paying for private insurance or employer-based 
benefits with their own incomes and earnings (Myles, 
1998: 344). 
Long-term care 
Publicly funded long-term care (LTC) services are, as in 
England, targeted at people with low income. They are 
provided as a safety-net programme as a part of Medic-
aid. Medicaid is the primary funder of LTC, and is organ-
ised by the federal government, but states are responsi-
ble for its implementation. As a means-tested programme 
it is designed to help people with limited income to pay 
for medical expenses. It allows beneficiaries to choose a 
provider of home health care aid service or a doctor and 
delivers institutional nursing facility services. Only limited 
facility-based programmes are available for those who 
need assistance at home to live independently. Medic-
aid programmes are granted only as a last resort. In or-
der to become an eligible person, an applicant must ex-
haust or “spend down” personal resources first. In some 
states beneficiaries have to contribute and make small 
co-payments (OECD, 2011a). Another programme, Medi-
care, is run by the federal government for older people 
and aims to cover hospital visits, specialist appointments 
and health care costs, i.e., hospice care and doctors’ visits 
during hospitalisation. It does not cover any LTC services. 
At the same time the US has one of the most developed 
markets for private insurance for people with higher in-
comes and accumulated assets. Although only 5% of the 
population over 40 is covered, the largest total payment 
for LTC comes from private contributions and out-of-pock-
et payments. Residential LTC is divided between facilities 
accepting Medicaid beneficiaries and privately funded 
ones that do not. Both kinds of service providers have to 
meet legal standards to operate. There is a great deal of 
variation in the intensity of care provided, as well as in its 
character (some do not include medical assistance) and 
price. By contrast home and community-based services 
(HCBS) are mostly provided by family or friends, with ad-
ditional medical services provided by doctors. In some 
communities Adult Day Care Programs (ADC) or senior 
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centres have been established for the elderly during the 
day. Social workers provide some help with meeting daily 
needs, but meals provision and help with transportation 
are organised by private agencies (OECD, 2011a).
The introduction of a new voluntarily, publicly managed 
LTC insurance programme, called Community Living As-
sistance Services and Supports (CLASS), has been dis-
cussed for some years. According to this proposal, a 
monthly premium would be deducted via the payroll for 
enrolled persons to provide cover on a guaranteed-issue 
basis. They would become entitled to life-time cash ben-
efits if they met eligibility criteria (based on degree of im-
pairment), and had five years of contributions to the sys-
tem and had worked at least three of those years (CLASS, 
2010). However, in October 2011 the US administration de-
cided to abandon it as “unworkable”. In 2010, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA or Obamacare) 
was introduced. Its aim was to increase the quality and 
affordability of health insurance and lower the proportion 
of uninsured people (which reached 17% of the popula-
tion in 2006). The Congressional Budget Office projected 
that the ACA would lower Medicare spending in the future 
(CBO, 2011), which might improve the chances of introduc-
ing CLASS. 
Childcare and early education
The ‘liberal’ approach to child care in the US can be ob-
served in the arguments used by the government to justi-
fy its subsidies and welfare programmes. They are based 
on three claims: improving equity - to give children the 
same opportunities to fulfil their potential, which is in line 
with the “American dream” narrative; second, encourag-
ing parents to work — to make them employed and self-
sufficient instead of enrolled in welfare; and third, ad-
dressing childcare market imperfections – if the social 
and intellectual development of a child can be improved 
and beneficial to society in the future, the subsidies are 
justified (Duncan and Giles, 1996).
In 1996 four different child care subsidy programmes for 
low income families were replaced by the single block 
grant – the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act (PRWORA) increased funding for child care 
and enabled states to set the subsidy programme rules as 
well as giving them choice in transferring up to 30% of the 
funds from the cash grant welfare programme (Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families - TANF) into the CCDF 
and to spend that money directly on child care (Blau and 
Tekin, 2005). In 1999 all the CCDF allocation, of about 
USD 5 billion, and an additional USD 4 billion from the 
TANF block grant was spent on child care (Blank, 2002). 
To be eligible for subsidy parents must be employed, in 
school or in training and their children must be under the 
age of 13 (the cut-off age for eligibility for CCDF subsi-
dies). Priority for funds is given to families with very low 
incomes who are not recently, currently, or likely future 
welfare recipients and to families with children with spe-
cial needs. Still, most households receiving cash transfers 
from public assistance programmes are headed by single 
mothers (over 90% of TANF cases with an adult recipient 
in 1998) (Committee on Ways and Means, 2000: 437; Blau 
and Tekin, 2005). 
In 2012, 26% of children under 3 and 70% of children aged 
3-5 were enrolled in formal childcare facilities (US Cen-
sus Bureau, 2015). Typical childcare fees are amongst 
the highest in OECD countries, even accounting for cash 
or tax subsidies (almost non-existent in the US) (OECD 
Family database, 2014). In total US public expenditure on 
childcare and early education services was 0.37% of GDP 
in 2011 (OECD SOCX, 2015). 
Care Economy, 
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General method
This analysis uses official input-output tables produced 
by national statistical offices to calculate the full employ-
ment effects of additional demand, created for example 
by government spending, for the products of a particu-
lar industry. The methodology used is well-known. In this 
analysis we have followed closely the methods used by 
the Scottish government’s statistical office (see Scottish 
Government (2015), referred to below as the “Scottish 
methodology notes”).
This is how the different ways in which employment is 
generated is explained:
If there is an increase in final demand for a particular 
product, we can assume that there will be an increase 
in the output of that product, as producers react to meet 
the increased demand; this is the direct effect. As these 
producers increase their output, there will also be an in-
crease in demand on their suppliers and so on down the 
supply chain; this is the indirect effect (also called Type I). 
As a result of the direct and indirect effects, the level of 
household income throughout the economy will increase 
as a result of increased employment. A proportion of this 
increased income will be re-spent on final goods and ser-
vices: this is the induced effect (also called Type II).
[http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/
Input-Output/Mulitipliers ](emphasis added)
In this research we are interested in employment effects 
and we find these by calculating the total direct, indirect 
and induced employment changes due to a unit increase 
in final demand. We also calculate the direct, indirect and 
induced employment effects separately. We can then 
multiply any suggested additional demand by the total 
employment effect, or any component of it, to calculate 
the amount of additional employment generated.
Type I employment effects (indirect)
1) The process starts with published symmetric tables, 
giving the quantity of output of  industry  used directly 
in industry  (where  and  are industry rows and columns 
respectively, with rows showing supply and columns use): 
1. These tables also include rows for imports and for 
gross value added by industry, so that the column to-
tals give the total output of each industry.
2. They also include columns for the composition of final 
demand, from government, consumers (households), 
gross capital formation and exports.
Appendix 2 simulation 
methodology
3. Such tables are produced by national statistical offic-
es, but some provide product-by-product tables (P x 
P) instead of industry by industry (I x I). The methodol-
ogy used subsequently is unchanged, with the results 
needing to be interpreted in terms of products rather 
than industries.
4. See Scottish methodological notes for an explanation 
of how they derive symmetric tables, which is not en-
tirely straightforward. Slightly different assumptions 
are made by each statistical office.
2) Calculate from the symmetric table, or find also from 
the statistical office, the direct requirements matrix, A , 
whose cells gives the amount of the product of industry 
i needed directly to produce a unit of the product of in-
dustry j, 
•	 Wj the total output of industry, is calculated as the to-
tal of the th column of the symmetric table. 
•	 The direct requirements matrix, A, is calculated from 
the symmetric table by dividing each cell by its col-
umn total.
3) Calculate from the direct requirements matrix, or find 
also from the statistical office, the Leontief inverse matrix 
or ‘total requirement’ matrix,L, whose elements capture 
the whole supply chain and give the total amount of the 
product of industry  needed directly and indirectly to 
produce a unit of the product of industry J. 
•	 The total requirement matrix,L, is calculated from the 
direct requirement matrix, by L = I + A + A2 + A3 + ... = 
(I - A)-1,  where I is the identity matrix. 
•	 The Type I output multiplier for industry j is equal to 
∑i LIJ .
4) From published figures on employment by industry, 
calculate the direct employment vector, w, whose com-
ponents w give the employment directly required to pro-
duce a unit of the product of industry j.
•	 wj is calculated as employment in industry j divided by 
its total output Y. This can be headcount or FTE.
•	 Similarly a vector recording gender-specific employ-
ment by industry can be calculated we used the pro-
portion of women employed). Again this can be head-
count or FTE.
•	 Note that FTE numbers and the gender breakdown of 
employment were not always available for industries 
categorised as in the I-O tables. If the employment data 
were less disaggregated, e.g., in Australia, the same 
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gender breakdown was applied to all sub-divisions. 
Where the employment data were more or differently 
disaggregated, e.g., for government sectors of the US, 
the gender breakdown was fine-tuned for each indus-
try by using other sources on a case-by-case basis.
5) Employment effects (and corresponding gendered em-
ployment effects) for each industry j are calculated as follows:
•	 The direct effect is wj, the direct labour needed to 
produce a unit of output of industry j.
•	 The total Type I effect (direct plus indirect) is ∑i wi 
Lij, the sum of all the labour required directly and in-
directly to produce an additional unit of output of in-
dustry j.
•	 The indirect effect is calculated as the difference be-
tween the total Type I and the direct effect ∑i wi Li -  wj 
which gives the labour required indirectly to produce 
a unit of output of industry j.
6) The employment multiplier(s), the ratio of indirect to di-
rect effects, can then be calculated (including by gender, 
FTE etc.).
7) Effects on employment rate(s) can also be calculated.  
•	 The percentage points rise in the employment rate 
(by gender) equals the total employment effect di-
vided by the working age population (of that gender).
Type II employment effects (induced)
1) For type II effects, we augment the direct requirements 
matrix A by adding the household sector. Using data 
from the symmetric table, we add a column to matrix A 
that gives the composition of consumer demand by in-
dustry per unit of household income and a row that gives 
compensation of employees (and ideally also including 
income from self-employment but not profits) per unit of 
output of each industry.
2) The additional column of consumer demand by indus-
try is derived from the corresponding column of the sym-
metric table divided by total household income. The latter 
can usually be found in the National Accounts (household 
sector) data. Where household income is not directly 
available, we used the total household expenditure di-
vided by (1 - gross saving ratio). 
•	 The sector of households usually includes non-profit 
institutions serving households (unless separated) 
and no adjustment has been made to account for this 
category
3) Calculations are then the same as before, creating an 
augmented type II Leontief inverse matrix, Li, and using 
that to calculate:
•	 The total Type II effect (direct plus indirect plus in-
duced) is ∑i wi Lij, the sum of all the additional labour 
required, directly, indirectly and induced, when an ad-
ditional unit of output of industry  is produced.
•	 The induced effect is calculated as ∑i wi Lij - ∑i wi Lij 
the difference between the total Type II and total Type 
I effects. This gives the employment induced by ad-
ditional household consumption when an additional 
unit of output of industry  is produced.
Some caveats
Some statistical offices calculate such employment ef-
fects themselves, but many do not, although they provide 
the input-output tables and other data needed for their 
calculation. One reason some do not is that the derivation 
of employment effects involves making some quite strong 
assumptions. 
Below we list the assumptions that are most relevant to 
our analysis and, where we can, say the likely effects of 
them not holding.
1. Available supply. It is assumed that the economy has 
no supply-side constraints, that is, that any addition-
al inputs required, including labour, can be found or 
produced without taking resources away from exist-
ing activities. If this is not the case, then employment 
effects will be overstated. Actual employment effects 
are likely to be dependent on the extent to which 
the economy is operating at or near full capacity or 
whether there is unemployment.
2. No effects on wage or price levels. If there are any 
constraints on the availability of inputs, such as skilled 
labour, wages and prices would be expected to rise, 
and therefore to reduce the quantity that any given 
amount of expenditure can purchase. Such ‘crowding 
out’ effects are assumed not to occur. For this reason, 
especially where there are skill or other labour short-
ages, employment effects may be overestimated   
3. No change in methods of production. It is assumed 
that additional demand does not lead to a change in 
how industries produce their output and therefore 
their input requirements (and how these are sourced). 
This may not hold where there are fixed capital re-
quirements, economies of scale or a range of ways of 
producing the same output. If this assumption does 
not hold, but the previous two assumptions still did, 
employment effects might be over or underestimated.
4. All households spend in the same way and continue 
to do so. In calculating induced effects, final demand 
from households is assumed to retain its existing com-
position and simply rises or falls in proportion to house-
hold income. If additional employment leads house-
holds to save more, this assumption does not hold and 
employment effects are likely to be slightly exagger-
ated. Further this assumption will not hold if any ad-
ditional income generated through employment goes 
to households whose spending patterns differ system-
atically from the average, though without investigating 
the spending patterns of different types of households, 
we cannot know whether this would lead to over or un-
derestimation of employment effects.
See Paul Gretton (2013) for a more complete analysis of the 
assumptions and potential pitfalls of this sort of analysis.
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Data sources
Australia Australian Bureau of Statistics
Denmark Statistics Denmark database
Germany Eurostat
Italy Eurostat
UK Eurostat 
ONS
Japan Statistics Japan
US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Classifications of industries
Country classification of industries used in their Input-
Output tables differ but are broadly in line with the inter-
national standard classification (NACE – Rev2), used in 
the Eurostat tables (and in Denmark).17
Europe
The differences between Denmark and the other three 
European countries are mainly to do with level of aggre-
gation of industries. Denmark provides tables using 117 in-
dustry divisions (NACE 3 digit) whereas Eurostat provides 
tables using only 64 industries (NACE 2 digit).
Statistics Denmark distinguishes between industries 87 
and 88 whereas Eurostat (for Italy, Germany and the UK) 
doesn’t.
17 See explanatory notes and list of industries by level of detail at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/docu-
ments/1965800/1978839/NACE_rev2_explanatory_notes_EN.pdf/b09f2cb4-5dac-4118-9164-bc-
c39b791ef5 
Appendix 3 Data sources and 
classification
Division 87, “residential care activities”, in NACE rev2, is 
composed of the following categories:
87.1 Residential 
nursing care 
activities
Nursing care facilities
87.2 Residential 
care activities 
for mental 
retardation, 
mental health 
and substance 
abuse
Provision of residential care and 
treatment for patients with men-
tal health and substance abuse 
illnesses by paramedical staff 
and social workers
87.3 Residential 
care activities 
for the elderly 
and disabled
Provision of residential care and 
treatment for elderly and dis-
abled by paramedical staff and 
social workers
87.9 Other residen-
tial care activ-
ities
Social work activities provided 
on a round-the-clock basis di-
rected to provide social assis-
tance to children and special 
categories of persons with 
some limits on ability for self-
care (except elderly, disabled 
and persons with mental retar-
dation)
Division 88, “social work activities without accommoda-
tion”, includes the following categories:
88.1 Social work 
activities 
without ac-
commodation 
for the elderly 
and disabled
Social, counselling, welfare, re-
ferral and similar services which 
are aimed at the elderly and dis-
abled, without accommodation
88.91 Child day-
care activities
Child day-care activities
88.99 Other social 
work activi-
ties without 
accommoda-
tion n.e.c.
Other social work activities with-
out accommodation n.e.c.
Charitable activities like 
fund-raising or other supporting 
activities aimed at social work
For the construction sector (sector F of NACE 1 digit), again 
Statistics Denmark distinguishes between its three differ-
ent divisions, whereas Eurostat aggregates all of them. 
Sector F includes the complete construction of residential 
and non-residential buildings (division 41), the complete 
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construction of civil engineering works (division 42), as 
well as specialised construction activities, if carried out 
only as a part of the construction process (division 43), 
which includes maintenance and repair (e.g., plumbing, 
plastering etc.). Division 41 is used in our simulations.
US
The US categories are based on the North American clas-
sification (NAICS).
See details: https://www.census.gov/eos/www/na-
ics/2012NAICS/2012_Definition_File.pdf
The construction sector (sector 23) is the aggregate 
of the following categories:
230301 Nonresidential maintenance and repair
230302 Residential maintenance and repair
233210 Health care structures
233230 Manufacturing structures
233240 Power and communication structures
233262 Educational and vocational structures
233293 Highways and streets
2332A0 Commercial structures, including farm struc-
tures
2332B0 Other nonresidential structures
233411 Single-family residential structures
233412 Multifamily residential structures
2334A0 Other residential structures
The nursing and residential care facilities industry 
(623) is the aggregate of the following categories:
6231 Nursing care facilities (skilled nursing facilities)
6232 Residential intellectual and developmental 
disability, mental health, and substance abuse 
facilities
6233 Continuing care retirement communities and 
assisted living facilities for the elderly
6239 Other residential care facilities
The social assistance industry (624) comprises the 
following:
6241 Individual and family services
6242 Community food and housing, and emergency 
and other relief services
6243 Vocational rehabilitation services
6244 Child day care services
However, social care provided in people’s homes, which 
is included in NACE rev 2 division 88 above for Europe-
an countries, is not part of the same classification in the 
US, since it is included in ‘medical ambulatory services’. 
Indeed home health care services (6216), part of industry 
621 (Ambulatory Health services) in the input-output ta-
bles, sits alongside other medical services provided out-
side hospitals. It is described as follows:
This industry comprises establishments primarily en-
gaged in providing skilled nursing services in the home, 
along with a range of the following: personal care ser-
vices; homemaker and companion services; physical 
therapy; medical social services; medications; medical 
equipment and supplies; counselling; 24-hour home care; 
occupation and vocational therapy; dietary and nutritional 
services; speech therapy; audiology; and high-tech care, 
such as intravenous therapy.
Japan
See note: http://www.soumu.go.jp/english/dgpp_ss/sei-
do/sangyo/san07-3.htm
For the purpose of the input-output analysis, Japan uses 
a different classification than its Japan Standard Industrial 
Classification, with the main categories of interest shown 
in the tables below
For constructions:
4111 -011 Residential con-
struction (wooden)
411 Building con-
struction
4111 -021 Residential con-
struction (non-wood-
en)
4112 -011 Non-residential con-
struction (wooden)
4112 -021 Non-residential con-
struction (non-wood-
en)
4121 -011 Repair of construc-
tion
412 Repair of con-
struction
4131 -011 Public construction 
of roads
413 Public con-
struction
4131 -021 Public construction 
of rivers, drainages 
and miscellaneous 
public construction
4131 -031 Agricultural public 
construction
4191 -011 Railway construction 419 Miscella-
neous civil 
engineering 
and construc-
tion
4191 -021 Electric power facili-
ties construction
4191 -031 Telecommunication 
facilities construc-
tion
4191 -099 Miscellaneous civil 
engineering and 
construction
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There is no explicit detail of how the two industries of so-
cial insurance and welfare and nursing care used in the 
input-output tables were constructed from the standard 
classification shown in the list below. Presumably, sectors 
851-53 are likely to be included in the social insurance 
and welfare industry (643) and 854 could provide the bulk 
of industry 644 nursing care. However, the correspond-
ence between residential care and non-residential care 
is not easy, since sector 854 also includes 8544 “home 
visit care services” for example. The main distinction is 
between 853, which provides care for children, and 854 
and 855, which provide care for the elderly and for the 
disabled respectively, residentially or not.
See detailed explanation here: http://www.soumu.go.jp/
main_content/000323828.pdf
85 SOCIAL INSURANCE, SOCIAL WELFARE AND CARE 
SERVICES
850 ESTABLISHMENTS ENGAGED IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
OR ANCILLARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
8500 Head offices primarily engaged in managerial 
operations
8509 Miscellaneous establishments engaged in adminis-
trative or ancillary economic activities
851 SOCIAL INSURANCE ORGANISATIONS
852 WELFARE OFFICES
853 CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
8531 Day nursery
8539 Miscellaneous child welfare services
854 WELFARE SERVICES FOR THE AGED AND CARE 
SERVICES
8541 Special nursing homes for the elderly
8542 Health care facilities for the elderly requiring long-
term care
8543 Day care short stay services for the aged
8544 Home-visit care services
8545 Group homes for the elderly with dementia
8546 Fee charging homes for the aged
8549 Miscellaneous welfare services for the aged and 
care services
855 WELFARE SERVICES FOR DISABLED PERSONS
8551 Residence support services
8559 Miscellaneous welfare services for disabled per-
sons
859 MISCELLANEOUS SOCIAL INSURANCE, SOCIAL 
WELFARE AND CARE SERVICES
8591 Offender rehabilitation services
8599 Miscellaneous social insurance, social welfare and 
care services
Taken from http://www.soumu.go.jp/english/dgpp_ss/sei-
do/sangyo/san13-3a.htm#p
Australia
Australia uses the Australian and New Zealand Standard 
Industrial Classification (rev 2006) ANZSIC.
For the construction division, four groups are distinguished 
and are broadly in line with the NACE rev divisions with 
residential building (although distinguished in the Aus-
tralian classification from non-residential building), heavy 
engineering and civil construction, and construction ser-
vices, which include all the preparatory works, installation 
(plumbing etc.) and repair, as in NACE division 43.
With respect to healthcare and social assistance services 
(division Q), Australian input-output tables distinguish the 
following subdivisions:
Health care services (subdivision 84, hospitals, and 85, 
medical services).
Residential care and social assistance (subdivision 86, 
residential care, and 87, social assistance, the latter in-
cluding 8701, child day care services, which excludes pre-
school education, similar to the other countries’ treatment 
of preschool education).
See details here: http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/Aus-
stats/subscriber.nsf/0/5718D13F2E345B57CA257B95001
76C8F/$File/12920_2006.pdf
Overview of occupational composition of 
care services
Japan
The social insurance and welfare sector is dominated by 
five occupations (97% of total):
•	 Childcare workers (34%)
•	 0527102 Home visiting care workers (27%)
•	 0527101 Care workers in medical and welfare facili-
ties (16%)
•	 General clerical workers (14%)
•	 Other social welfare specialists (other than childcare 
workers) (8%)
The nursing care sector is concentrated as follows:
•	 0206000 Healthcare professionals (34%) of whom 
more than half are 0206026 nurses (20% of total)
•	 0207037 Social welfare specialists professionals (oth-
er than childcare) (8%)
•	 0527101 Care workers in medical and welfare facili-
ties (44%)
Note that in the Japanese classification of occupations, 
childcare workers and kindergarten teachers are classi-
fied as professionals whereas care workers and home 
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visiting care workers are in service workers occupations 
(with hairdressers, bartenders and travel guides) (SOC 
Rev 5 2009).
US
623 – Residential care is mainly composed of:
•	 21 Community and social service occupations (social 
workers, counsellors, etc.) (6%)
•	 29 Health practitioners and technicians (17%)
 - 291141 Registered nurses (6%)
 - 292061 Vocational nurses (8%)
•	 31 Healthcare support (34%)
 - 311011 Home health aides (7%)
 - 311014 Nursing assistants (25%)
•	 35 Food preparation and related (10%)
•	 39 Personal and care services (14%)
 - 399021 Personal care aides (9%)
624 – Social assistance is mainly composed of:
•	 21 Community and social service occ. (16%)
•	 25 Educational occ. (16%)
 -252010 Preschool and kindergarten teachers   
 (9%)
•	 31 Healthcare support (7%)
 - 311011 Home health aides (5%)
•	 39 Personal and care services (35%)
 - 399011 Childcare workers (11%)
 - 399021 Personal care aides (20%)
Australia
In Australia, the three main care occupations are:
•	 4211 child carers: provide care and supervision for 
children in residential homes and non-residential 
childcare centres
•	 4231 aged and disabled carers: provide general 
household assistance, emotional support, care and 
companionship for aged and disabled persons in their 
own homes
•	 4233 nursing support and personal care workers: 
provide assistance, support and direct care to pa-
tients in a variety of health, welfare and community 
settings
(No statistics on distribution of these occupations by in-
dustry)
Europe
The main care occupations within ISCO-2008 are grouped 
in category 53 (ISCO 2 digit) within ISCO 1 digit group 5 
of services and sales workers and sit along with personal 
services workers (51)such as waiters and hairdressers, 
sales workers (52),  and protective services workers (54).
Category 53 is composed of the following sub-groups:
•	 531 Child care workers and teachers aides
•	 5311 Child care workers
•	 5312 Teachers aides
•	 532 Personal care workers in health services
•	 5321 Health care assistants
•	 5322 Home-based personal care workers
•	 5329 Personal care workers in health services not 
elsewhere classified
Denmark has employment and earnings data for each of 
these detailed occupations. Italy and Germany do not.
The UK does not have it either when using ISCO but has 
a different classification used in its more detailed national 
earnings and employment data.
UK 
The UK uses a slightly different classification (SOC 2010) 
for its national employment and earnings data with the 
following categories:
Within the main occupational category 6 of Caring, leisure 
and other services occupations, the following highlighted 
occupations are relevant:
612 Childcare and related personal services
  6121 Nursery nurses and assistants
  6122 Childminders and related occupations
  6123 Playworkers
  6125 Teaching assistants
  6126 Educational support assistants
And
614 Caring personal services
  6141 Nursing auxiliaries and assistants
  6142 Ambulance staff (excluding paramedics)
  6143 Dental nurses
  6144 Houseparents and residential wardens
  6145 Care workers and home carers
  6146 Senior care workers
  6147 Care escorts
  6148 Undertakers, mortuary and crematorium assistants
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UK (2014)
 
 
Total Men Women
Total in em-
ployment 
(000)
Number 
(000)
% PT
Mean 
weekly 
earnings 
(£)
Number 
(000)
% PT
Mean weekly 
earnings (£)
Total 2 30,537 16,347 12.7% 605.20 14,190 42.4% 394.80
Benchmark
2231 Nurses 590 68 13.3% 622.70 522 34.1% 515.00
2315 Primary and nursery edu-
cation teaching professionals
431 51 10.5% 639.60 381 28.9% 566.20
Care occupations
612 Childcare and related per-
sonal services
829 46 28.1% 243.90 783 47.8% 224.80
6121 Nursery nurses and assis-
tants
174 0 - 291.00 171 41.8% 232.20
6122 Childminders and related 
occupations
129 0 - 139.20 129 38.4% 254.00
6123 Playworkers 34 0 - 127.90 30 77.7% 138.30
6125 Teaching assistants 356 28 31.9% 255.80 328 52.2% 230.80
6126 Educational support assis-
tants
136 11 0.0% 255.10 125 44.9% 220.90
614 Caring personal services 1,309 242 21.5% 323.20 1,067 43.8% 266.90
6141 Nursing auxiliaries and as-
sistants
300 62 15.3% 341.70 238 44.7% 295.40
6145 Care workers and home 
carers
792 132 27.5% 294.70 660 44.8% 245.00
6146 Senior care workers 72 13 0.0% 377.90 59 28.0% 323.90
Note: Mean earnings are for employees only (from ASHE, 2014). Median earnings not reliable for small occupations. Population in employment include both employees and self-employed (ONS 
Labour Force Survey 2014)
Appendix 4 Earnings in different 
care occupations
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Denmark (2013)
 
 
Total Men Women
Hourly 
earn-
ings 
(DKK)
Monthly 
earn-
ings 
(DKK)
Full-time 
employ-
ees
Hourly 
earn-
ings 
(DKK)
Monthly 
earn-
ings 
(DKK)
Full-time 
employ-
ees
Hourly 
earn-
ings 
(DKK)
Monthly 
earn-
ings 
(DKK)
Full-time 
employ-
ees
All occupations 290.87 38,525 1,428,117 309.21 41,400 704,568 270.72 35,368 723,548
Benchmark
2221 Nursing profes-
sionals
293.11 37,529 49,063 306.75 40,288 2,134 292.46 37,397 46,929
2341 Primary school 
teachers
292.7 38,146 57,908 294.97 38,963 18,560 291.57 37,742 39,348
Caring occupations
53 Personal care 
workers
219.03 28,138 141,501 206.76 27,016 21,285 221.31 28,347 120,216
531 Child care work-
ers and teachers 
aides
199.51 25,688 44,352 189.15 24,689 9,279 202.38 25,965 35,073
5311 Child care work-
ers
199.45 25,680 44,319 188.95 24,662 9,256 202.35 25,961 35,064
532 Personal care 
workers in health 
services
228.12 29,280 97,149 220.57 28,841 12,006 229.24 29,344 85,143
5321 Health care 
assistants
241.39 30,924 45,009 235.32 30,696 6,761 242.51 30,966 38,248
5322 Home-based 
personal care work-
ers
219.14 28,153 45,329 204.63 26,910 4,381 220.8 28,295 40,949
5329 Personal care 
workers in health 
services not else-
where classified
237.28 31,561 1,384 210.66 28,302 180 241.77 32,111 1,204
Note: data are for full-time employees only (source StatBank from Statistics Denmark http://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1280) 
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Australia (2014)
 
Men Women Total
AVERAGE WEEKLY TOTAL CASH EARNINGS (AU$)
All occupations 1,429.80 940.20 1,182.40
Benchmark
2411 Early childhood (pre-primary 
school) teachers
797.50 1,073.00 1,070.20
2412 Primary school teachers 1,378.00 1,263.80 1,279.20
2544 Registered nurses 1,553.00 1,191.40 1,220.10
Care occupations
4211 Child carers 397.50 543.30 536.90
4231 Aged and disabled carers 728.40 667.50 679.00
4233 Nursing support and personal 
care workers
856.10 651.20 695.80
All employees,  
2014 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics - 63060DO011_201405 Employee Earnings and Hours, Australia, May 2014
52|56  Investing in the Care Economy
US (2014)
 
 
All industries 61 Education 623 Residential care 624 Social assistance
Employment 
(000)
Hourly 
median 
wage 
($)
Employment 
(000)
Hourly 
median 
wage 
($)
Employment 
(000)
Hourly 
median 
wage 
($)
Employment 
(000)
Hourly 
median 
wage 
($)
All occupations 135,128 17.09 12,759 21.51 3,258 12.7 2,768 11.61
Benchmark
Elementary and mid-
dle school teachers 
(252020)
1,998 27.44 1,983 27.46 - 1 20.51
Registered nurses 
(291141)
2,687 32.04 73 27.72 195 28.77 22 27.97
Care occupations
Preschool and kin-
dergarten teachers 
(252010)
511 16.39 228 23.23 - 252 12.51
Home health aides 
(311011)
799 10.28 0 10.75 238 10.41 151 10.05
Nursing assistants 
(311014)
1,428 12.07 8 13.42 804 11.55 26 10.51
Childcare	workers	
(399011)
583 9.48 132 11 28 11.34 316 9.19
Personal	care	aides	
(399021)
1,257 9.83 4 11.9 295 10.26 550 9.98
Notes: wages for school teachers are only available annually so the figure is the mean hourly wage assuming 2080h annual pay (40h pw).  
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2014 – all employees
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(US continued) Earnings by gender for full-time employees (2014)
 
Total Men Women
Number 
of workers 
(000)
Median 
weekly earn-
ings ($)
Number 
of workers 
(000)
Median 
weekly 
earnings 
($)
Number 
of workers 
(000)
Median 
weekly earn-
ings ($)
Total, full-time wage and sal-
ary workers
106,526 $791 59,450 $871 47,076 $719
Benchmark
Elementary and middle 
school teachers
2,730 980 534 1,096 2,196 956
Registered nurses 2,309 1,090 245 1,190 2,064 1,076
Care occupations
Preschool and kindergarten 
teachers
499 634 13 - 486 625
Nursing assistants and home 
health aides
1,364 472 164 528 1,200 466
Childcare workers 406 442 21 - 385 444
Personal care aides 667 434 133 465 534 425
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2014 – full-time employees
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Europe (2010)
Eurostat data from the European Structure of earnings Survey (only establishment of 10 or more employees).
Occupational distribution of earnings and employees for the industry ‘Human Health and social work activities’.
Monthly earnings (EUR)
 
 
Denmark Germany Italy UK
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Total 4,018 3,389 3,383 2,527 3,347 2,350 3,895 2,544
Managers 6,172 5,188 5,727 3,979 6,036 5,438 4,659 3,513
Professionals 4,939 3,889 5,840 3,704 6,326 4,855 5,622 3,490
Technicians and associate 
professionals
4,297 3,629 2,629 2,483 2,445 2,269 2,943 2,390
Clerical support workers 3,185 3,189 2,178 2,310 1,996 2,010 2,295 1,885
Service and sales workers 2,888 2,936 2,052 1,985 1,790 1,587 1,904 1,727
Skilled agricultural, forestry 
and fishery workers
: : 2,112 1,818 1,798 2,246 1,593 1,822
Craft and related trades 
workers
: : 2,567 1,940 2,039 1,405 2,649 2,064
Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers
: : 1,697 1,781 2,150 1,830 1,817 1,752
Elementary occupations 2,957 2,655 1,759 1,762 1,821 1,547 1,784 1,553
Employees (000)
 
 
Denmark Germany Italy UK
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Total 114,088 517,297 683,005 2,259,498 349,778 733,724 774,435 2,549,184
Managers 4,982 8,739 18,315 21,936 15,628 10,885 57,394 117,071
Professionals 49,255 197,553 176,855 321,247 84,089 70,679 341,061 940,033
Technicians and associate 
professionals
6,501 41,940 296,311 1,257,104 123,889 364,935 95,621 280,128
Clerical support workers 2,137 15,715 27,945 143,592 49,009 95,158 40,166 300,239
Service and sales workers 45,027 229,048 95,354 308,880 37,953 144,069 168,743 800,602
Skilled agricultural, forestry 
and fishery workers
: : 4,645 1,160 : : : :
Craft and related trades 
workers
: : 21,033 6,221 8,948 5,619 10,813 2,173
Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers
: : 18,751 13,198 7,442 1,095 8,005 1,904
Elementary occupations 4,744 24,147 21,225 184,509 22,190 41,234 34,725 103,391
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